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Abstract 
A distinct focus on female youth experiences in political contests has been lacking in the 
literature on youth and political violence despite many female youth’s involvement with 
armed groups. The first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993) saw the participation of many 
female youth alongside both teenage boys and men. This is notable especially given the 
patriarchal culture of Palestinian society in that women and young girls are traditionally 
confined to the private sphere. Additionally, public interactions with men and young boys 
could be viewed as improper and threats to one’s honor and purity may ensue. In light of 
these facts, the purpose of this study is to investigate the experience of Palestinian female 
adolescents in zones of political conflict - specifically in the Gaza Strip during the First 
Intifada. More specifically, this study explores the relationship between socioeconomic 
status, religious, political and individual characteristics on differences in levels of female 
participation and activist behaviors. Data were collected via self-report survey in the Gaza 
Strip in 1998 from a sample of 960 youth, 375 of which were female. Models predicting 
political involvement are assessed through hierarchical linear regression analyses. Results 
indicated that socioeconomic status, age, efficacy, religiosity, and political affiliation 
predicted Palestinian female youth activism in the first Intifada. No interaction was found 
between religiosity, political affiliation, and activism. These findings are discussed in relation 
to the broader literature on civic and political engagement of youth as well as gender issues 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of war is not unique to the modern age. Rather, history reminds 
repeatedly of the use of wars to advance a cause or ideology. Today, there are wars in Africa, 
Asia, the Middle-East, and Indonesia. A relatively neglected aspect of war is understanding the 
role of youth in conflict. This is an important area of investigation because studies have shown 
that in current or recently ended conflicts both male and female youth are actively involved with 
armed groups in between 36 to 55 countries throughout the world (Boothby & Knudsen, 2000; 
McKay, 2005).  
Despite the prevalence of political conflict, there is limited research on youth and 
political violence; a fact that is true even more so for female youth. Thus, little is known about 
the gendered nature of political violence, whether that be the degree of participation or the 
effects of that participation on females. This lack of research is particularly unfortunate because 
there are clear historical cases where female youth have been very actively involved in conflict. 
Perhaps the most notable case has been the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli Occupation, 
during which it has been documented that majority proportions of female youth participated in 
various types of political activism during the first Intifada (1987-1993) (Barber, 2001; Barber & 
Olsen, 2009).  Little is known about Palestinian female youth political activism in the first 
Intifada despite the high rates of participation and the orthodox Muslim culture of Palestine in 
which women are typically restricted to the private sphere (e.g., the home) (Rubenberg, 2001).  
Of the studies that do focus on female experience with political conflict, little direct 
attention is given to female youth and often these studies are concerned with the effects of 
exposure to political conflict (i.e., PTSD, depression, and anxiety) and do not explore predictors 
 2 
of political activism. However, despite a lack of scholarly knowledge on female political 
activism in political conflicts, studies in peaceful nations do explore gendered experience of 
political participation. Overall, this body of literature shows that girls tend to be more apathetic 
towards political participation than boys (Bynner & Ashford, 1994; Hart, Atkins, Markey, & 
Youniss, 2004). However some studies document higher levels of societal commitment in girls 
than boys (Watts & Guessous, 2006). Additionally, girls tend to be more affected than boys by 
the opinions of their parents regarding their political beliefs and behaviors. Specifically, girls 
were found to be more likely than boys to cease activist behaviors if they perceived low parental 
acceptance of these behavior. However, their political ideologies were not affected by perceived 
parental acceptance (Gordon, 2008).  
 From a theoretical viewpoint, theories from multiple disciplines suggest explanations for 
female youth political activism, as well as specifically Palestinian female youth activism, 
whether considered as a group or as individuals. For example, from sociology, Relative 
Deprivation Theory credits political violence to the economic health of a nation or particular sub-
group (i.e., Palestinians). According to this theory, socioeconomic status of the group, and 
arguably of the individual, is then a driving force for political action against the elite leaders or 
outside rulers (Gurr, 1970; Wilkinson, 2004). Furthermore, ethic identity theorists suggest that it 
is perceived deprivation along with feelings of threat to one’s own ethnic group that motivate 
people to collective action (Petersen, 2002). The history of Palestinian resistance towards Israel 
and the severe economic conditions leading up to the first Intifada arguably created an 
environment of perceived economic inequality and ethnic threat for the Palestinian peoples (see 
Roy, 1995).  
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From political science, Political Stabilization Theory suggests that the degree of 
religiosity as well as political affiliation is associated with activism. According to this theory, 
political views and behaviors of youth are influenced by significant socializing agents such as 
parents, teachers, religious leaders, and political leaders. These socializing agents pass down 
their political ideologies and behaviors to youth, and thus there is continuity of political views 
between the generations (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006). Specifically in the Palestinian case, the 
degree to which Palestinian girls identify themselves as religious, as well as report affiliation 
with a specific political party provides insights into the motivating factors for political activism. 
By examining the tenets of Islam, the dominant religion in Palestine, in addition to the gendered 
political and religious ideologies of Palestinian political groups, assumptions can be made about 
political views and behaviors that are promoted by the Palestinian culture and political groups, 
and, thus, transmitted to young female youth.  
In addition to Relative Deprivation Theory and Political Stabilization Theory, Collective 
Identity theorists (a psychological theory) suggest that efficacy is a significant predictor of 
political activism. Collective Identity states that an individual appraisal of one’s own ability as 
well as the group’s ability to achieve pre-determined goals is significantly associated with 
collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). This theory suggests that female 
youth who believe in their own ability to create positive change for the Palestinian people 
through political action as well as those who identify the first Intifada as a successful campaign 
are more likely to engage in activism than those who are more pessimistic in their views.  
Finally, classic identity theory (i.e., Erikson, 1968) suggests that older female youth 
would be more likely to engage in political action than younger females, due to the task of youth 
in forming their own identity through the exploration of many identities, such as activist. 
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However, more recent scholars question the relevance of the use of western notions of identity 
development and social constructions of adolescence in non-western societies (i.e., Hammack, 
2008).  
 For the purposes of this thesis, then, specific predictors of political activism among 
Palestinian female youth in the Gaza Strip during the first Intifada were identified through both 
theory and scholarly literature on political involvement in countries of conflict as well as 
political activism in peaceful societies. The variables that were identified and tested in this thesis 
are: socioeconomic status, religiosity, affiliation, religio-political affiliation, efficacy, and age. 
The effects each variable may have on youth’s political activism was explored by reviewing 
theory and scholarly literature, as well as examining the cultural, political, and historical context 
of the first Intifada. In general, this evaluation of theory and literature lead to hypotheses that 
socioeconomic status would be negatively associated with political activism; that affiliation with 
secular or fundamental political groups as well as degree of religiosity would have different 
effects on political activism; that degree of religiosity will moderate the relationship between 
political affiliation and activism; and that efficacy would be positively associated with political 
activism. 
The survey data used in these analyses come from a larger project on Palestinian adolescents 
living in the Gaza Strip, the Adolescents and Political Violence Project (APVP), in which the 
intent was to retrospectively assess adolescents’ experience in the first Palestinian Intifada 
(Barber, 2008). APVP participants responded to a questionnaire that assessed demographics, 
victimization, activism, and a variety of measures of psychosocial functioning.  
The survey built on a previous survey study (Barber, 1999a, 2001) and interview work 
(Barber, 1999b, 2009) on Palestinian adolescents in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the West 
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Bank. Questionnaires were given to a representative sample of 917 Palestinian youth (including 
383 females) five years after the first Intifada (1998). All participants were between the ages of 
20-27 years old to ensure that the each young man and woman had lived through at least three 
years of the first Intifada during their teen years. The questionnaires were developed after 
considerable immersion in Gazan culture and through extensive focus group analysis to ensure 
that questions regarding types of political activism were relevant to the conflict under study 
(Barber, 2009). Due to the specific purposes of this thesis, only the data from the female 
respondents will be used in analyses.  
Analysis will begin by addressing issues of measurement.  Dimensions of political 
activism and religiosity have been identified in previous analyses of these data but using the 
combined sample of both males and females (see Barber & Olson, 2009). The thesis will re-
examine these for the female sample using exploratory factor analysis. The socioeconomic status 
and efficacy variables will also be factor analyzed using exploratory factor analysis to assess the 
reliability of the indicators used to measure these constructs. Finally, the variables of political 
affiliation and religio-political affiliation will be created by contrast coding. 
The associations between the constructs of interest will be tested first via bivariate 
correlations, and then through hierarchical multiple regression. Based on the complexity of 
religious and political culture in Palestine, two models will be used in this analysis: the main 
effects model and a moderating model. In the main effects model, religiosity and religio-political 
affiliation will be used as direct predictors of activism (along with political affiliation, SES, 
efficacy, and age). In the moderating model, religiosity will be tested as a moderator of the effect 
of religio-political affiliation on activism.  Finally, in order to test for the relationship between 
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the independent variables and the different dimensions of activism, both models will be tested 



















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Despite the prevalence of political violence throughout the world, a relatively neglected 
aspect of war is understanding the role of youth in conflict. This is regrettable because youth, 
including young women, have historically been involved in war (see DePauw, 1998). In addition, 
studies have shown that in current or recently ended conflicts both male and female youth are 
actively involved with armed groups in between 36 to 55 countries throughout the world 
(Boothby & Knudsen, 2000; McKay, 2005). These statistics do not include countries or conflicts 
in which youth experience war (i.e., as passive victims) but do not actively engage in political 
conflict or voluntarily participate in conflict. Taken together, it is clear that political violence 
affects the lives of a great number of youth around the world. 
Research on youth and political violence generally has been primarily concerned with the 
effects of exposure to political violence, particularly effects on psychopathology (e.g., PTSD, 
depression, and anxiety). Basically, studies use quantitative data to test the predictive links 
between the amounts of political violence witnessed or experienced and negative psychosocial 
outcomes. While most quantitative studies do not distinguish between male and female youth, 
some have tested for gendered effects of exposure, typically as a matter of secondary interest 
(e.g., Brajsa-Zganec, 2005; Kimhi & Shamai, 2006). Of those studies that do report gender 
differences, research indicates that in general females report more fear, depression, PTSD, and 
general or multiple psychological symptoms when compared to boys. Additionally, female youth 
report lower levels of coping than male youth (i.e., Ajdukovic, 1998; Durakovic-Belko, 
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Kulenovic, & Dapic, 2003; Klingman, 2001) (see Barber & Schulterman, 2009, for review of 
youth and political violence literature) 
In addition to this quantitative literature, some few studies have focused primarily or 
exclusively on female youth experiences. Most of these are studies of child soldiers which have 
not placed primary importance on assessing negative outcomes, but rather have attempted to give 
a more descriptive, holistic view of the experiences of girls amidst political conflict. For 
example, the literature on girl soldiers describes the ways in which girls become involved in 
armed groups, their experiences while a part of armed groups, and the effects of involvement, 
often with the intent of illustrating gendered experiences of female child soldiers. Among others, 
these gendered experiences include sexual and domestic abuses while part of armed groups and 
the resulting stigmatization from civilian communities especially if these girls return to their 
communities with children. In addition, girls may acquire a skill while with an armed group, 
such as nursing or public speaking, but are unable to use the skill once reintegrated back into 
civilian communities due to the status of women in their society (see Spellings, 2008 for a 
review of this literature). 
Apart from these limited attempts to appreciate female experience in war and conflict, the 
largest void of attention and information has to do with understanding predictors of involvement 
in conflict (i.e., as opposed to understanding its effects as is most commonly done). Specifically, 
very little is known about which females participate in political conflict and why (apart from the 
brief work on female child soldiers). This is relevant because it is clear that in some conflicts 
female youth do actively participate. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the case of the 
Palestinian struggle against the Israeli Occupation in which female adolescents were actively 
engaged in political conflict during the first Intifada (1987-1993). Specifically, majorities of 
 9 
females reported various types of activism, such as throwing stones (50%), demonstrating (63%), 
and delivering supplies to Palestinian fighters (80%) (Barber, 2008; Barber & Olsen, 2009). 
While substantially lower than their male counterparts in that particular conflict, these majority 
proportions of female youth activism are dramatically higher than 25% average youth 
participation rate (male or female) in political movements historically (Cairns, 1996). Moreover, 
this level of female youth’s activism is particularly noteworthy given the orthodox Muslim 
culture of Palestine – particularly in the Gaza Strip - in which women are typically restricted to 
the private sphere (e.g., the home) (Rubenberg, 2001). Despite these cultural and religious 
sanctions, much of the female activism was public in nature. This contradiction in gendered 
expectations and gendered behavior makes the study of female activism all the more interesting 
and important.  
“Who” were the Palestinian females who were actively involved? How did they differ 
from their counterparts who were less active? Does socioeconomic status explain political 
activism, and, if so, in which direction? Can female youth activism be explained by their political 
orientation or religiosity?  What role do personal characteristics, such as age and self-efficacy, 
play in understanding female political participation?  
Understanding the characteristics of those who participate is important since research 
suggests that Palestinian females who reported high degrees of participation in the first Intifada 
experienced both positive and negative effects of their participation. In previous analyses of the 
data to be used in this thesis Barber and Olsen (2009) found that Palestinian female youths’ 
retrospectively reported activism was positively related 5 years later to civic involvement, social 
competence, and religious commitment. In an earlier study, Barber (1999a, 2001) also found a 
positive relationship between activism and depression for Palestinian female youth. Thus, for 
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these young women, engagement in political activism brought negative psychological effects, 
but bolstered their civic, social, and religious lives. If individual characteristics can predict 
involvement in political conflicts, then social service agencies will have a better idea of which 
girls are more likely to become involved and may be better able to provide services to these 
young women that can protect them from the physical dangers and negative effects of political 
activism, while also simulating an environment that fosters the development of positive 
characteristics such as civic engagement and social competence.  
Before proceeding with the theoretical development of hypotheses, a discussion of the 
historical, political, and cultural context of the lived experiences of the Palestinian girls under 
study in this thesis is presented in order to ground the reader in a more complete understanding 
of the complex nature of Palestinian female youth political activism in the first Intifada.  
Palestinian Resistance 
Conflict and inequalities between the Palestinian Arab and Jewish populations is thought 
to have begun with the modern-day Zionist movement and the 1897 Basle Congress of the 
Zionist Organization in which leaders set forth a goal of working toward the establishment of a 
Jewish state in Palestine (W. Khalidi, 1987; Tessler, 1994). Zionists’ efforts were encouraged 
and facilitated in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration, a letter from Lord Balfour, the British 
foreign secretary, that expressed sympathy for the Jewish desires by declaring support for a 
national home for the Jewish people in Palestine (C. D. Smith, 2001; Tessler, 1994).  
Not surprisingly, the Arab community living in Palestine at this time viewed the Balfour 
Declaration as a denial of their rights to their own homeland (C. D. Smith, 2001). Palestinian 
Arab frustrations arose towards the British Empire (who assumed a Mandate over Palestine at the 
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end of World War I) and Jewish settlers and lead to increasing tensions and conflict among 
indigenous Arabs and in-migrating Jews. For example, tensions particularly culminated in the 
Arab Revolt (1936-1939) (W. Khalidi, 1987; Tessler, 1994). Similarly, the Arab-Israeli War 
(1947-1948) erupted after the Palestinian region was partitioned by the United Nations to create 
an official Jewish nation, Israel (C. D. Smith, 2001; Tessler, 1994). This resulted in several 
hundred thousand Palestinians becoming refugees, primarily in the West Bank (then governed by 
Jordan) and the Gaza Strip (then governed by Egypt) (Tessler, 1994). Furthermore, major 
conflict erupted again in the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and Palestinians and other Arab 
countries which resulted in Israel conquering various regions populated with Palestinians, 
including: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem (also then held by Jordan), the Golan 
Heights (in Syria), and the Sinai (in Egypt). (C. D. Smith, 2001; Tessler, 1994).  
A litany of other conflicts continued throughout the years between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors as well as with the Palestinian people. Through these conflicts, Palestinians gained 
international attention and recognition of their right to existence and to inhabit lands which were 
linked to their ancestors and historical presence in the Middle East. Due to international pressure, 
in 1979 the Sinai was returned to Egypt via the Camp David Accords, but the rest of the 
territories Israel acquired in the 1967 war remained under their control, with the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank officially considered the Occupied Palestinian Territories (C. D. Smith, 2001; 
Tessler, 1994). 
There are at least two camps of thought concerning the benevolence of Israel’s 
occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. On the one hand, supporters of the Occupation 
claim Israel aided these territories in making significant economic and standard of living 
improvements. For example, Israel helped expand the number of Gazan homes with electricity to 
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89% in 1981 as compared to 18% in1967. Additionally, between 1968-1978 Gaza’s gross 
national product (GNP) increased 12.1%, whereas Israel’s GNP only increased 5.5% during that 
same time period (Tessler, 1994). 
On the other hand, Palestinians viewed Israeli occupation as less favorable. While a high 
number of Palestinians were employed in Israel, there was little infrastructure development in the 
occupied territories. A limited number of new schools were constructed and existing schools 
lacked adequate facilities. Additionally, little if any effort was made by the Israeli government to 
develop port facilities, railroads, modern highways, or airports. The high dependence on Israel 
for employment, electricity, and water was viewed by many Palestinians as de-development 
instead of growth (a view held by many Israelis) (Roy, 1995; Tessler, 1994). Economic scholars 
suggest that despite the increase in the Palestinian economy in the early years of the Israeli 
occupation, in the three years leading up to the first Intifada (1987-1993) the Palestinian people, 
specifically those in the Gaza Strip, experienced a substantial economic downfall. For example, 
Gaza’s gross national product declined 30% due to Israeli-led reduction of trade with Gaza and 
West Bank, a 25% income loss among Palestinians in Israel, 20-30% decline in the value of 
Gaza’s economic output, and a doubling of Palestinian child labor (Roy, 2007).  
Moreover, Palestinians pointed to the Israel’s “Iron Fist” policy which allowed 
deportations, press censorship, collective punishments such as school closings and curfews, 
demolition of homes, and permitted the use of Israeli gunfire to disperse Palestinian protesters as 
signs of oppression, inequality, and a threat to the Palestinian people (Hunter, 1993; Tessler, 
1994). The violence experienced by the Palestinians has been particularly humiliating due to the 
relative personal nature of the violence. For example, many Palestinian youth witnessed either 
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their fathers or a neighbor’s father beaten by Israeli soldiers, forced to sit in the mud, or clean up 
garbage, all of which are culturally defined as severe forms of humiliation (Barber, 2008).  
The First Intifada 
From the Palestinians’ perspective, it is this view of historical oppression, humiliation, 
and inequalities as well as the failed diplomatic efforts of Palestinian and Israeli leaders to reach 
a sustainable peace agreement that gives explanation to the Palestinian uprising, otherwise 
known as the first Intifada (1987-1993). Smith (2001), a historical researcher of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, characterized the first Intifada as a “spontaneous eruption of hatred and 
frustration... Much anger resulted from personal factors not directly related to politics or 
economics but the daily harassments, arrests, and beatings that the ordinary Palestinian had faced 
for many years” (p. 414). Historical as well as contemporaneous frustrations and inequalities 
culminated on December 8
th
, 1987, when an Israeli tank transporter crashed into cars in Gaza 
killing 4 Palestinians and ignited spontaneous and violent demonstrations from Palestinians, in 
which adolescents participated widely: an event that signaled the beginning of the first 
Palestinian Intifada (Hunter, 1993; Roy, 2007; Tessler, 1994). (Intifada is an Arabic word 
meaning “uprising” or “shaking off”) 
The beginning years (1987-1988) of the first Intifada were arguably the most violent 
years of the near six year conflict and are characterized as a period of intensifying violence. 
Israel’s military reaction to the Palestinian uprising was to use force. Firing live ammunition 
towards protestors, beating stone throwers, often breaking their bones, raiding homes, detaining 
suspected opposition leaders, imposing curfews, and closing schools were a few of the tactics 
used by the Israeli military (Tessler, 1994).  For their part, Palestinians both retaliated and 
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provoked the occupying Israeli Defense Force (IDF) by, as examples, erecting barricades and 
burning tires to impede the traffic of IDF vehicles, demonstrating, throwing stones and Molotov 
cocktails (a crude incendiary device) at the IDF, and boycotting Israeli goods (Hunter, 1993; 
Roy, 1995, 2007; C. D. Smith, 2001).   
The Gaza Strip 
The Gaza Strip experienced the heaviest amounts of violence between the Palestinians 
and Israeli army. Barber and Olsen (2009) suggest that the most intense forms of the conflict 
occurred in the Gaza Strip because of Gaza’s geographic location, economic circumstances, and 
its role as the center of both Palestinian political efforts and militant movements. For example, in 
1988 there were approximately 750,000 Palestinians living in the 125 square miles Gaza Strip, 
an area one-fifth the size of the West Bank (C. D. Smith, 2001; United Nations, 1989). Of these, 
54% lived in eight refugee camps (United Nations, 1989), with the remainder in villages and 
towns. These economic circumstances, population density, and history of oppression arguably 
cultivated an atmosphere of uprising or revolt against the ruling Israeli government by the 
Palestinian people, somewhat more so in Gaza than in the West Bank. Moreover, militant 
Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad organized and recruited 
supporters in Gaza, which, in turn, caught the attention of the Israeli military (Hunter, 1993; 
Tessler, 1994).  
Youth Resistance 
A distinguishable characteristic of the first Intifada was the proportion of Palestinian youth 
who actively and voluntarily engaged in the fight. Approximately 80% of Palestinian youth 
participated in political activities, such as throwing stones, bringing supplies to adult fighters, 
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and demonstrating. The majority, if not all, of these youth were well-versed in the history of 
Israel’s occupation in Gaza and the West Bank and the past responses by Palestinians to the 
Israeli occupation (Barber, 1999b, 2006, 2009). In fact, the Intifada is called by many the 
“children’s crusade.” Yasser Arafat, the former leader of the Palestinian political group Fatah, 
often used the phrase “children of the stone” in reference to the Palestinian youth who fueled the 
uprising (Ibrahim, 1994). Youth committees, which employed both males and females, emerged 
and worked alongside other community resistance groups, usually run by a political group, 
uniting the effort of Palestinian adults and youth against the Israeli army (Hunter, 1993). It is 
suggested that Palestinian youth during the first Intifada did not only harbor ill feelings towards 
Israeli soldiers, but were also upset at older Palestinian generations, many of whom appeared to 
youth as passive in their approach towards the Israeli government, having failed to better the 
lives of the Palestinian people. Through involvement in the Intifada these youth attempted to 
change the state of the Palestinian people in a way that older generations had failed to do 
(Hunter, 1993; R. Khalidi, 1997). 
The first Intifada officially came to an end in the fall of 1993 with the Israeli-Palestinian 
Declaration of Principles in Oslo, Norway. The outcomes of the Principles were threefold. First, 
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat officially recognized the state of Israel and its right to exist in 
peace and security. Second, Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin recognized Yasser Arafat and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization as the official representative of the Palestinian people. Third, 
Israel agreed to withdraw soldiers from all Palestinian territories except for Gaza, though Rabin 
agreed to allow Palestinians self-rule in Gaza (C. D. Smith, 2001).  Despite this agreement, the 
Declaration of Principles did not bring lasting peace to these two people groups as evidenced by 
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the second Palestinian Intifada (2000-2005) and the recent Israeli military campaign in the Gaza 
Strip (December 2008-January 2009). 
History of Palestinian Women’s Political Participation 
While the number of Palestinian women and young girls who have historically 
participated in public forms of political activism is overall smaller than Palestinian men, 
Palestinian women do have a history of political participation dating back to the early 1900s. For 
example, in 1917 Palestinian women marched alongside men in demonstrations in response to 
the British government’s attempts to create an Israeli nation-state (Sharoni, 1995). Palestinian 
refugee women living in Lebanon have been reported to have been instrumental in all facets of 
the Palestinian Resistance Movement against the Lebanese government in the mid 1900s, 
including diplomacy and leadership (Peteet, 1991). Additionally, in the 1960s Palestinian women 
and female youth began to participate in sit-ins, demonstrations, and sabotage missions against 
the Israeli army. In the 1970s and 1980s Palestinian political groups founded Women’s 
Committees which provided a structure through which Palestinian women and young girls could 
officially demonstrate political activism (Sharoni, 1995). Other forms of political participation 
that were traditionally dominated by men, such as demonstrating and erecting a Palestinian flag, 
became acceptable for women when their participation was defined by a desire to promote a 
Palestinian identity and for the right to raise children in peace and economic stability (Peteet, 
1991).  
Beyond these more gendered forms of participation, a small minority of women engaged 
in more extreme forms activism, such as planting bombs. Instead of seeing these activists as 
“women bombers,” it was customary in the Palestinian society to refer to these activists as 
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gender neutral. Scholars suggest that by avoiding gender labels with more extreme forms of 
activism, the society at large was able to understand and accept these behaviors that are arguable 
a huge departure from the gender norms in the Palestinian society. Thus, broader issues of the 
place, roles, and norms of women in Palestinian society, for the most part, went unchallenged 
(Hiltermann, 1998; Peteet, 1991; Sharoni, 1995).   
Even though many parts of the world refer to Palestinians living in Gaza, the West Bank, 
and neighboring Arab countries as refugees, some Palestinian women instead refer to themselves 
rather as militants and revolutionaries. These women believe the term refugee connotes a meek 
and helpless image. In her ethnographic study (participant observations, life histories, and in-
depth interviews) of the history of Palestinian female activism in Lebanon, Peteet (1996) found 
evidence that dating back to the 1970s Palestinian women have strongly rejected this helpless 
image. Instead they promoted an image of the Palestinian people that suggests these women are 
willing to fight against the injustices they, as a people, face (Peteet, 1996). Female youth who 
participated in the first Intifada would have seen their mothers and heard stories of their 
grandmothers’ engagement in the political sphere, and thus, perhaps, these young girls were in 
part imitating and extending the older generations’ political behavior.  
While historically some Palestinian women have participated in all facets of political 
activism, most of Palestinian women’s political participation appears to have been gendered in 
nature. In her book describing the history of Palestinian women’s political participation in 
Lebanon, Peteet (1991), for example, claims that in poverty and crisis situations Palestinian 
women retreat to domestic tasks since those tasks are fundamental to daily living. Palestinian 
women conceptualize political activism in terms of traditional gender ideologies and believe 
their goal is to keep Palestinian families alive and intact. Indeed, Women’s Committees, groups 
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or organizations founded between 1978 –1987 by each Palestinian political party that were 
responsible for grassroots level campaigning and organizing relief and emergency services, 
helped establish schools and food distribution centers. When schools closed, the Women’s 
Committees were responsible for providing alternative education to Palestinian children. In 
conjunction with the gendered work of the Women’s Committees, other forms of political 
activism in which Palestinian women and young girls have engaged in are visiting families, 
attending funerals, treating the wounded, and providing food and housing for Palestinian male 
fighters (Hiltermann, 1998; Nassar, 1989; Peteet, 1991; Rubenberg, 2001; Sharoni, 1995). 
Despite the services of the Women’s Committees listed above, not all of the work of the 
Women’s Committees was gendered in nature. The elite and middle class Palestinian women 
who were highly involved in administrative positions in these Committees utilized the Women’s 
Committees to define stances on social and gender issues. The leaders of the Women’s 
Committees sought to liberate women through promoting education and awareness of women’s 
issues. Hence, the Women’s Committees served dual purposes of providing relief and emergency 
services that are gendered in nature and promoting social change for Palestinian women by 
highlighting issues such as domestic violence and women’s health (Hiltermann, 1998; Sharoni, 
1995).  
Consistent with historical forms of Palestinian female activism, studies show the 
supportive nature of Palestinian female activism in the first Intifada. For example, Barber and 
Olsen (2009) found evidence of the gendered nature of youth’s political participation in that a 
higher percentage of Palestinian females reported engaging in supportive forms of activism (e.g., 
visiting the family of a martyr, caring for the wounded, and delivering supplies) than direct 
activism (e.g. demonstrating, throwing stones, and erecting a Palestinian flag). Thirty-nine to 
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77% of female youth reported engaging in some form of following instructions from political 
leaders or supportive forms of activism. With the exception of three items (demonstrating, 
throwing stones, and erecting a Palestinian flag), less than 20% of female youth reported 
engaging in direct, or non-supportive, forms of activism (Barber & Olson, 2009). Similarly, 
Huntington, Fronk, and Chadwick’s (2001) study of Palestinian female youth in the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank found that less than 50% of females reported participating in demonstrations, 
distributing leaflets, or throwing stones at Israeli soldiers (Huntington et al., 2001)  (see also 
Barber, 1999a; Barber, 2001).  
Despite this evidence of gendered political participation by Palestine females (i.e., more 
supportive, less direct), still high percentages of female youth did report in engaging in more 
direct forms of political activism in the fist Intifada. For example, anywhere between 40-65% of 
female youths in Gaza reported demonstrating, protecting someone from Israeli soldiers, 
throwing stones, erecting a Palestinian flag, or trying to distract soldiers away from participants 
(Barber & Olsen, 2009). These high percentages are surprising due to the cultural constraints and 
the gendered nature of most Palestinian female activism. These more direct forms of activism 
required that Palestinian girls break cultural scripts and historical norms. Thus, the high rates of 
overall activism, and particularly direct activism, beg the question: just who exactly are these 
girls who participated so actively? 
Explanations for Youth Involvement in Political Violence 
Despite a lack of scholarly knowledge of female political activism in political conflict, 
studies in peaceful nations (i.e. United Kingdom and United States) do explore gender 
differences in youth’s political activism and political views. In general, results indicate that 
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overall girls are more apathetic towards political behaviors and have less civic knowledge than 
their male counterparts (Bynner & Ashford, 1994; Hart et al., 2004). However, girls who are 
politically informed tend to be more pro-social in their political views and behavior than boys. 
This gender difference begins to emerge in adolescence indicating that young adulthood is 
critical for the development of gendered political identities (Baskir, 2006). Additionally, Watts 
and Guessous (2006) found that American girls were more likely to express higher levels of 
societal commitment (i.e., beliefs regarding community service, civic engagement, and 
advocacy) than boys. While societal commitment is not, in and of itself, a signal of political 
behavior or knowledge, it can be an indicator of political activism. 
Studies of female youth activism in peaceful nations provide a general understanding of 
female experience, however these studies do not speak to the unique circumstances of female 
youth political activism in conflict or, even more so, the complex intersection of cultural scripts 
and female participation. Therefore, in pursuing understanding of Palestinian female activism, 
the hypotheses of this thesis are informed by theories from a variety of disciplines that appear 
relevant to the task. To the extent that it is available, hypotheses will be informed also by 
previous research that has included attention to female experience.  
First, this section will give an overview of theoretical approaches that appear relevant 
generally to the study of female youth political activism. Examination of these theories suggests 
three main categories of potential explanation of political activism on the part of Palestinian 
female youth during the first Intifada: socioeconomic status, religiosity/ religio-political 
orientation, and efficacy.  The balance of this section, therefore, is organized according to those 
domains of prediction, in each of which theory and empirical findings are discussed and 
hypotheses formed.  
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General Theoretical Approaches 
In their book on collective violence, Barkan and Snowden (2001) state that in order to 
fully understand collective violence, one must review theories that explore macro as well as 
micro factors that are associated with collective action. For example, theories from psychology 
provide a rationale for the individual characteristics that motivate one to engage in political 
activism, whereas sociological theories highlight motivators for political activism at the group 
level. Since there has been no explicit theorizing about the population under study, this thesis 
will draw on a variety of theories from psychology, sociology, and political science to propose a 
model of predictors of political activism among Palestinian female youth. By examining both 
micro and macro scopes of inquiry one can gain a more holistic understanding of the motivators 
and factors that influence female youth political activism.  
Theories from sociology, such as Relative Deprivation Theory, identify and explain the 
causes of mass uprising and community unrest by examining macro level influences, such as the 
economic health of a nation or a particular sub-group (Gurr, 1970; Wilkinson, 2004). Second, 
from political science, Political Stabilization Theory suggests that youth shape their religio-
political ideologies by adopting the views of their parents or other significant adult role models 
and explains how religious and political beliefs are passed down from generation to generation 
(Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006). Third, psychology offers explanations of political activism 
through an understanding of identity development. While there are many aspects to one’s 
identity, two domains of identity are relevant to this thesis: ethnic identity and collective identity. 
Phinney (2006) describes ethnic identity, or identity with one’s group, as being the central 
defining characteristic of minority groups, and ethnic violence is thought to occur when two or 
more groups compete for the same resources (housing, jobs, water, etc.) and the disadvantaged 
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group feels threat to their own ethnic identity (Barkan & Snowden, 2001; Petersen, 2002; 
Phinney, 2006). Similarly, collective identity is cognitions shared by members of a single group 
(Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). It can be concluded that collective identity is formed by 
individuals sharing similar thoughts of deprivation and injustice, interacting together, and 
engaging in social or political movement that advance the group’s cause. While identity is not 
measured directly in this thesis, ethic identity and collective identity theory support and inform 
the formulation of hypotheses outlining the proposed relationship between specific predictors 
and political activism.  
Examination of these and other theoretical approaches have lead to the identification of five 
potential domains of antecedents of female activism among Palestinian youth: socioeconomic 
status, religiosity, religio-political affiliation, efficacy, and age. Accordingly, the chapter will 
now be organized according to those domains; in each elaboration on the relevant theory and 
empirical findings will be made.  
Socioeconomic Status 
Although there has been no specific analysis of female youth activism, both theory and 
empirical findings suggest that the socioeconomic level of this population would be a logical 
predictor of activism. As for theory, Relative Deprivation Theory attributes political violence to 
the economic health of a nation or group of people. Violence erupts when a nation or group 
identifies itself as having relatively less monetary resources or material goods than another 
group, with which comparisons are felt to be appropriate in such a way that the powerless group 
must identify themselves as being worthy of the same lifestyle as the privileged group. Feelings 
of disadvantage and oppression act as a catalyst for a group’s willingness to engage in political 
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violence as a means of changing the group’s status within the society (Gurr, 1970; Webber, 
2007; Wilkinson, 2004).  
Similarly, Ethnic Identity Theory from psychology suggests that violence between two 
groups emerges when the disadvantaged group feels a threat to its own ethnic identity and 
existence. Peterson (2002) identifies four types of feelings that are associated with ethnic 
violence: fear, hatred, resentment, and rage. Fear of lack of resources or safety first urges the 
individual or group to desire to satisfy safety concerns. Once an individual or group identifies the 
feeling of fear and safety concern, then hatred towards the other group prepares the individual or 
group to act on historical grievances. Thirdly, resentment, which comes out of fear and hatred, 
illuminates the discrepancies between one’s group and the other group. Finally, in some 
instances, rage appears and drives an individual or group to engage in self-destructive behaviors. 
If the first goal of safety and economic security, which is associated with fear, is not met, then 
Peterson suggests that it is likely that ethnic violence will ensue.  
Even though Relative Deprivation Theory and Ethnic Identity Theory speak to political 
violence at a group level, research also illustrates the relevance of deprivation to political 
activism at the individual level. For example, a study of female girl soldiers throughout the world 
(i.e. Angola, Colombia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka) revealed that poverty is a risk factor for 
involvement with an armed group (Kearins, 2002). While Kearins’ (2002) study indicates that 
poverty exacerbates the vulnerability of some young girls to be either abducted into armed 
groups or join as a means of securing basic necessities, it also shows that deprivation is a 
motivating factor for young girls to engage in political activism, which is often displayed in the 
form of political violence. 
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In non-violent communities in the United States, Hart, Atkins, Markey, and Youniss (2004) 
found that neighborhood poverty level was negatively associated with levels of religious and 
racial tolerance towards other groups in youth between the ages of 16 and 25. While this study 
did not assess the relationship between political activism or political violence and socioeconomic 
status, lower levels of tolerance towards the other group may increase the probability of 
discrimination or acts of violence towards the other group.  
Not all studies, however, indicate that poverty is positively associated with political activism. 
Research on youths’ voting habits, involvement in anti-smoking clubs, volunteer attitudes and 
behaviors, and civic identity has shown that socioeconomic status is positively associated with 
these civic activists’ behaviors (Atkins & Hart, 2003; Bynner & Ashford, 1994; Edwards et al., 
1992; Hart et al., 2004; Roker, Player, & Coleman, 1999). In a summary of variables that 
influence civic competence and civic participation in urban youth, Hart and Atkins’ (2002) 
suggest that youth who live in affluent neighborhoods engage in civic participation at a rate 33% 
higher than youth who live in poor neighborhoods, which is often in urban communities.  
The discrepancy in the literature on the effects of socioeconomic status and political activism 
can be understood by examining the context of the societies in which the research was conducted 
and the type of activism displayed. The studies referenced in the above paragraph were 
conducted in developed, peaceful countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, 
whereas the findings linking poverty to political activism have been made with samples from less 
developed countries or countries in conflict. Additionally, the types of activism, such as voting 
and volunteering, are generally viewed to be altruistic means of civic participation that promote 
the betterment of a society. While youth of higher socioeconomic status in Western, peaceful 
countries may disagree with political policies, they have the luxury (i.e., security and resources) 
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to engage in activist behaviors that are less focused on major political upheaval, but rather a 
continuation of peaceful transitions of power and societal improvements. While political 
activism in war-torn societies is often also focused on issues of social justice, the emotional toll 
of deprivation and oppression may motivate youth to join more radical political movements. 
Specifically, the tenet of Relative Deprivation Theory and Ethnic Identity Theory (i.e. poverty is 
a driving factor for political activism) has been documented in impoverished, unstable nations, 
such as Colombia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.  
Relative Deprivation Theory and Ethnic Identity Theory are particularly useful in explaining 
the conflict under study in this thesis, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Conflicts – both before and 
after the establishment of Israel over land – were fought over issues of national identity and 
economic equality (see earlier section on History of Palestinian-Israeli Conflict). Inequalities and 
disadvantages, such as harsh economic conditions and feelings of threat toward their existence as 
a people as well as an aspiration or the belief that their people group deserved national equality, 
prompted Palestinians to regularly fight against the Israeli army (see Hunter, 1993; R. Khalidi, 
1997; Roy, 1995, 2007; Tessler, 1994). For example, between 1988 and 1990 (the first three 
years of the first Intifada) Gazans lost an income of at least $300 million and saw a 30% decline 
in their gross national product due to job losses in Israel, the country which employed the 
majority of working age Gazans (Roy, 2007). Specifically, Gazan camp dwellers experienced the 
highest levels of unemployment (Barber, 1999b, 2001; Barber & Olson, 2009). Moreover, 
Palestinians believed in their right to exist as an independent country and national group with 
greater economic health (R. Khalidi, 1997). 
Additionally, in studies of testing the applicability of Relative Deprivation Theory and 
Ethnic Identity Theory on collective action in the West Bank, Khawaja (1995) found that Israeli 
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repression, in the form of land confiscation, significantly increased both collective and individual 
Palestinian action against Israeli forces. Collective and individual action included riots, 
demonstrations, rallies, flag raising, marches, and rock throwing. While this study examined 
Palestinian adults in the West Bank and not specifically female youth in Gaza, the findings 
suggest that perceived economic inequalities (i.e. ownership of land) do account for both 
Palestinian collective and individual political activism.   
Upon further examination of the Palestinian case, socioeconomic status may not only 
predict activism in general, but it might well predict specific types of activism as well. As 
mentioned above when discussing the role of Women’s Committees and the history of Palestine 
female participation in political activism, socioeconomic status was associated with the specific 
types of activities in which Palestinian women were engaging. For example, the elite and middle 
class Palestinian women were heavily involved in the administrative and advocate sectors of the 
Women’s Committees. Conversely, the poorer Palestinian women, many of whom lived in the 
refugee camps, organized and distributed the relief work of the Committees, activities that 
characterize supportive forms of activism as well as following instructions from activist leaders 
(Hiltermann, 1998; Sharoni, 1995).  
In sum, Relative Deprivation Theory and Ethnic Identity Theory suggest violence between 
two groups of people can be explained through the lack of resources of the disadvantaged group 
when compared to the other or advantaged group. Studies have shown how perception of relative 
deprivation applies to both the group and individual level. While there are conflicting findings as 
to the effects of socioeconomic status on activism, a closer examination of the economic health 
of the societies in which these studies are conducted reveals that in developing nations 
socioeconomic status is negatively associated with political violence on an individual level. In 
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terms of the Palestinian struggle, it would be logical to expect that lower socioeconomic status 
would not only predict activism in general, but particular supportive forms of activism. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are advanced:  
Hypothesis 1a: Socioeconomic status will be negatively associated with the political activism 
of Palestinian female youth.  
Hypothesis 1b: Socioeconomic status will be negatively associated more strongly with 
supportive forms of activism than with direct forms of activism.  
Religion and Politics  
In addition to the predictive link between socioeconomic status and political activism, theory 
and academic literature also suggest that political affiliation and religiosity would be related to 
political activism. This is particularly the case in Palestinian society given the strong and 
intertwined relevance of religion and politics. In order to explain the impact of religious and 
political affiliation on female youth’s political activism in the first Intifada, one must examine 
theory as well as religious and political doctrine. In regards to theory, Political Stabilization 
theory suggests that youth adopt the political views and behaviors of their parents or other 
socializing agents, such as religious and political leaders, older siblings, or teachers (Flanagan & 
Syvertsen, 2006). This theory argues that political beliefs and behaviors of youth are influenced 
by parents or other significant adults in that the youth imitate the political practices and beliefs 
that are displayed by significant adults or prominent leaders. Political Stabilization Theory 
provides explanation for the consistency of political beliefs and behaviors that are passed down 
from generation to generation (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006).  
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This theory is especially appropriate in explaining Palestinian political participation because 
Political Stabilization Theory accounts for the influence of religious beliefs and doctrine on 
political behavior. In Palestine, there is significant overlap between political and religious 
doctrines in that the vast majority of Palestinians (98% of Gazans) are Muslims and that the 
major political groups, such as Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, are all influenced by Islamic 
doctrine. In fact, Islam explicitly draws no boundaries between the religious, social, and political 
(Ahmed, 1992). These different political groups do, however, differ on the degree to which each 
group’s political agenda appears to be explicitly influenced by Islamic doctrine. Before 
discussing the confluence of religion and political affiliation, attention will be given first to these 
dimensions independently.  
Religiosity 
As noted above, Political Stabilization Theory accounts for the role of religious doctrine 
in predicting political activism, in that religious leaders can also be socializing agents and impart 
political ideologies and beliefs to their followers (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006). In addition, 
researchers have found a distinction between different dimensions of religiosity. In general, 
scholars agree there are two dimensions of religiosity: public (i.e., attending religious services) 
and private (i.e., praying alone) (see Chadwick & Top, 1993; Cornwall & Thomas, 1990). This 
point is particularly salient in the Palestinian context.  
The literature on youth activism and civic engagement in peaceful nations documents the 
role religion plays in the socialization of political beliefs and behaviors. Empirical literature 
studying the connection between religion and activist behaviors reveals that identification with a 
religious group, in and of itself, is not sufficient for explaining activist or non-activist behaviors. 
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Rather, the type of activism and religious doctrine must be examined. For example, American 
youth are more likely to engage in civic participation in the form of volunteering and community 
service if they belong to a religious institution that promotes these behaviors (Crystal & DeBell, 
2002; McLellan & Youniss, 2003; E. S. Smith, 1999). Additionally, Sherkat and Ellison (2007; 
see also Sherkat & Blocker, 1994, 1997) found that youth and young adults were less likely to 
engage in environmental and anti-war protests if their affiliated religious traditions and religious 
leaders spoke against these types of demonstrations. Youth not only hear about the virtues of 
engaging in civic participation (or the admonition of activism) through sermons, but also see 
other adults with the same religious affiliation engaging (or not) in activist behaviors. Thus, for 
these youth, activism is the result of a belief in the virtue of the activity, as taught to them 
through religious doctrine, and imitating the behavior of others in the same religious tradition.  
In order to understand the role religion plays in predicting Palestinian female youth 
political activism, an explanation of Islamic doctrine in regards to gender roles is necessary. The 
dominant religion in Palestine is Islam, and according to the Islamic religion, a woman’s role in 
the community and her autonomy outside the home are limited. Islam advocates for the seclusion 
of women from public activities in order to protect women’s purity. It is viewed as sexually 
impure for a woman to socialize with men other than her husband, father, or other male family 
members. To avoid any hints of impurity, Islamic women and young girls are rarely to engage in 
public activities unless it is with men with whom they are related (see Ahmed, 1992 for a full 
treatment of the role of women in Islam; Huntington et al., 2001). Since Islam makes specific 
statements regarding Islamic women’s role in the society and in accordance with previous 
literature on the relationship between religion and political activism, women and young girls who 
are more orthodox in their interpretation of Islam are expected to follow Islamic teachings on 
 30 
gender roles and, thus, less likely to go against these teachings and participate in political 
activism, especially direct forms of activism. According to Political Stabilization Theory, the 
actions of Palestinian girls who describe themselves as orthodox Islamists are determined by the 
socialization of gender roles, either through the teachings of Islam or seeing other orthodox 
Islamic females abstaining from political activism in the public sphere. Therefore the following 
hypothesis is advanced. 
Hypothesis 2a: Religiosity will be negatively associated with the political activism of 
Palestinian female youth.  
Hypothesis 2b: Religiosity will be negatively associated more strongly with direct forms of 
activism than with supportive forms of activism.  
Political Affiliation 
In addition to degree of religiosity, affiliation with a political group may also provide 
explanation as to political activism for female Palestinian youth. According to Political 
Stabilization Theory, political leaders are socializing agents who transmit their political 
ideologies and behaviors to their followers, especially youth (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006). 
Therefore insights can be gleaned into the political identity of females who reported belonging to 
any political group such as Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or PLFP (see section on Religio-
Political Affiliation below for discussion of these groups). For these girls the act of signifying 
association with any political group shows not only commitment to the group but also awareness 
and internalization of the historical struggle for national identity.  
Differentiating between youth who are affiliated with a political group and those who are 
not is an important distinction to identify and test since almost half (47%) of Palestinian female 
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youth to be studied in this thesis reported that they did not belong to a specific political party 
during the Intifada (Barber & Olsen, 2009). In contrast, 27% percent identified themselves as 
Fatah, 19% self-identified as Hamas or Islamic Jihad, and 7% as PLFP or another political party. 
Political Stabilization Theory along with the history of the Palestinian resistance towards Israeli 
policy and practice suggests that female youth who report affiliation with a political group 
implies awareness and embracing of the political agenda (i.e., resistance) and would thus be 
more likely than girls who report no affiliation to engage in political activism during the first 
Intifada. Therefore the following hypothesis is advanced.  
Hypothesis 3: Female youth who reported an affiliation with any political group will have 
higher levels of overall activism than female youth who reported no affiliation.   
Religio-Political Affiliation 
 Despite the logic of the arguments for independent, direct effects of religiosity and 
political affiliation presented above, the overlap in Palestinian society of religion and politics 
recommends consideration of the two forces together as well when hypothesizing about political 
activism in female youth. In order to more fully understand the joint impact of religion and 
political affiliation, a closer examination of the major political groups operative in the Gaza Strip 
during the first Intifada is necessary. They were: Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).  
While all Palestinian political groups are influenced by Islamic religion and all groups desire 
to achieve an independent Palestinian state, they differ in their beliefs as to the role of Islam in 
achieving a political replacement of the Israeli occupation. For example, Fatah, a secular political 
group formed in the 1959, is driven by a nationalistic political agenda which does not ascribe to 
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the fundamental tenets of Islam regarding gender scripts (i.e. women not allowed in the public 
sphere) nor to the exclusion of a right for the existence of an Israeli state. Instead, Fatah has been 
and currently is willing to engage in diplomatic talks with Israel and other nations in hopes of 
achieving a sustainable, two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Essentially, the 
Fatah leadership does not dictate the role of women in Palestinian society beyond what is 
culturally defined (Hunter, 1993; Lybarger, 2007; Peteet, 1991; Roy, 2007).  
In contrast, Hamas (formed in 1987) and Islamic Jihad (formed in the 1980s) are 
characterized as militant, orthodox fundamentalist groups in which the political agenda is driven 
explicitly by their interpretations of Islamic doctrine. For example, Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
desire to create an Islamic state in Palestine that is reflective of traditional gender roles in which 
women have little autonomy to move freely in public spaces. During the first Intifada, both 
groups, but especially Hamas, urged the people to return to their religious roots, including the 
return of women to the domestic sphere (Hunter, 1993; Lybarger, 2007; Peteet, 1991). Scholars, 
such as Moghadam (2003) and Rubenberg (2001), claim that Hamas politicized gender during 
the first Intifada by equating Palestinian victory in the first Intifada with a return to traditional 
gender scripts for all females regardless of their religious preference.  
 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), established in 1967, is a 
communist political party that utilizes militant tactics to fight Israeli oppression. Unlike Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad, PLFP (lead by the Ahmad Sa’adat, a Christian Palestinian in exile) does not 
seek to create an Islamic Palestinian state, but rather advocates for a secular, democratic nation. 
Due to its non-orthodox leanings, PLFP does not dictate strict gender roles, but has been noted as 
engaging in behaviors that run contrary to Islamic teachings, such as failing to fast during 
Ramadan and allowing women to dress in non-traditional Western clothing (Lybarger, 2007; 
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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," 2009). However, despite its political significance, 
relatively few female youth in Gaza reported affiliation with PLFP (Barber & Olson, 2009). 
Due to the differing religious and political stances of the political groups outlined above, 
assessing Palestinian female youth’s religio-political affiliation is an initial attempt to reflect and 
test for the reality of the intersection between religion and politics  To illustrate, it would be 
sensible to expect that young women who belonged to Fatah would have likely been engaged in 
political activism, specifically direct, front line, forms of political activism, since Fatah is less 
orthodox in gender role ideology and its leaders would not mandate specific behaviors for 
Palestinian females. In contrast, Palestinian girls who reported identification with fundamentalist 
Islamic groups (i.e., Hamas and Islamic Jihad) would be expected to have engaged in less 
political activism due to the fundamental Islamic underpinnings and strict gender rules which are 
characteristic of these two groups. Moreover, for the Palestinian females who identified 
themselves as belonging to fundamentalist Islamic groups, but nevertheless reported engaging in 
political activism, it is logical to expect that these female youth would have engaged in the less 
direct, more gendered forms of activism, such as following instructions from political leaders or 
the various forms of supportive forms of activism (i.e. caring for the wounded, delivering 
supplies, visiting a family of a martyr, etc.). More specifically, the hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 4a: Female youth who reported affiliation with the political group Fatah will have 
higher levels of both supportive and direct activism than their counterparts who reported 
affiliation with fundamentalist Islamic groups (Hamas and Islamic Jihad combined). 
Hypothesis 4b: Identification with Fatah will predict higher levels of direct activism than 
supportive activism.  
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Hypothesis 4c: Female youth who reported an affiliation with the Islamic groups will have 
higher levels of supportive activism than direct forms of activism.  
Hypothesis 4d: Female youth who reported an affiliation with the Islamic groups will have 
lower levels of supportive activism than females who reported an affiliation with Fatah.  
A second, more refined test of the intersection of religion and politics is to test for the 
interaction of the two in predicting political activism. Simply identifying oneself as a member of 
a specific political party speaks to both the political agenda of the group and the religious 
underpinnings. By assessing only the relationship between religio-political affiliation and 
activism, one does not know if participants are identifying with a political group because of its 
religious influences or policies regarding Palestinian nationality and Israeli occupation. 
Therefore testing the degree to which religiosity moderates the impact of religio-political 
affiliation better captures the intersection between religion and politics and thereby would add 
more precision to understanding the relative impact of politics and religion on female activism. 
Due to the strict gendered cultural scripts of Islam and fundamental Islamic political groups, 
it is expected, then, that Palestinian females who reported affiliation with Islamic fundamental 
groups and reported high degrees of religiosity will have engaged in political activism to 
differing degrees than girls who were affiliated with Islamic fundamental groups but reported 
low degrees of religiosity. Additionally, the relationship between affiliation with Fatah and 
degree of religiosity will follow the same pattern as for affiliation with Islamic fundamental 
groups, however not to the same extent. This is so because it can be expected that a Fatah girl’s 
interpretation of Islam would be less restrictive than the interpretation of a girl who belongs to an 
Islamic fundamental group.  More specifically hypotheses are advanced as follows:  
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Hypothesis 4e: Religiosity will moderate the impact of religio-political affiliation, such that 
females who reported affiliation with the Islamic groups and reported high degrees of religiosity 
will have lower levels of overall activism compared to females who reported affiliation with the 
Islamic groups but reported low degrees of religiosity.   
Hypothesis 4f:  Identification with Fatah and reported high degrees of religiosity will be 
associated with lower levels of political activism than identification with Fatah and low degrees 
of religiosity. 
Hypothesis 4g: The moderating effect of religiosity will be more pronounced for affiliation 
with Islamic fundamental groups than with Fatah, such that the highest level of overall activism 
will be had by less religious, Fatah females, followed by, in descending order: highly religious 
Fatah females, less religious Islamic females, and highly religious Islamic females.  
Efficacy 
In addition to socioeconomic and religio-political forces that drive activist behavior, it is also 
likely that activism at the individual level is influenced by individual characteristics. One such 
factor would be the degree to which the individual feels that activism is effective in addressing 
the grievances or otherwise meeting the goals of the broader society. Accordingly, perceived 
efficacy is considered in this thesis as an additional predictor of Palestinian female youth’s 
political participation.  
Collective Identity theorists suggest that identification with a disadvantaged group with little 
or no opportunity to become part of the advantaged group and the perceived efficacy of the self’s 
and group’s ability to obtain goals work in conjunction as key predictors of collective action 
(Klandermans, 1984; van Zomeren et al., 2008). In their meta-analysis of predictors of collective 
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action, van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) found that perceived injustice, identification 
with the disadvantaged group, and self- and group efficacy all predicted collective action in the 
form of protest behaviors. In all studies in the meta-analysis, group efficacy was measured by 
appraisals of the effectiveness of the groups’ actions to achieve its desired goals; self-efficacy 
was measured and defined as appraisal of one’s own ability to effectively aide in achieving the 
group’s goals.  
In addition to the study by Zomeren et al. (2008), other work has found evidence of the 
impact of group and self-efficacy on future political action. For example, Brunsting and Postmes 
(2002) identified group efficacy as well as self-efficacy as key predictors of future online 
collective action for environmental activists in the Netherlands. Additionally, Hornsey et al. 
(2006) found that perceived effectiveness of an environmental rally on influencing policy and 
government actions predicted future political activism intentions in Australian economic and 
globalization activists. These studies suggest that individuals who believe in the group’s and 
their own ability to achieve the group goals are more likely to participate in political action than 
those individuals who doubt their group’s ability and their own ability to achieve the goals.  
From a gendered perspective, Taylor (1999) and Brown and Ferguson (1995) theorize 
that girls and women are more likely to engage in political action when they have positive beliefs 
about their ability to affect a desired outcome. These authors argue that a woman’s cognitive 
view of her personal capabilities and knowledge in part determines if the woman will become an 
activist. A woman’s cognitive schema may allow her to break traditional cultural norms and 
engage in public forms of political activism (Brown & Ferguson, 1995; Taylor, 1999). This 
viewpoint is quite salient for the population under study in this thesis. Participation in the first 
Intifada, even gendered participation (i.e. supportive activism), required female youth to break 
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tradition and enter into a public sphere alongside non-relative men. Assessing perceived efficacy 
of youth may provide explanations as to why certain girls engaged in activist behaviors 
compared to other girls who did not.  
In accordance with theory and previous research, efficacy in this thesis is measured by 
examining female youth’s self-appraisal of their actions (perceived individual efficacy) as well 
as their overall beliefs about the success or failure of the first Intifada (perception of group 
efficacy). Despite no precedence to consider separate effects of group and self-efficacy, the 
literature suggests that an examination of each type of efficacy (self and group) will each be 
uniquely associated with activism. Therefore both self and group efficacy will be aggregated and 
tested independently. Specifically,   
Hypothesis 5a: Perceived group efficacy will be associated positively with political 
activism among Palestinian female youth. 
Hypothesis 5b: Perceived self efficacy will be associated positively with political 
activism among Palestinian female youth. 
Age 
Finally, although preference is given to the socioeconomic, religious, political, and personal 
antecedents of activism described above, age of youth will also be included in the predictive 
model. This is guided by classic developmental theory and some empirical findings. 
Theoretically, the most salient task for youth is identity formation which is influenced by cultural 
and historical factors and is signified by a struggle for self-and group-identification in socio-
historical-political realms that are viewed as important to the achievement of identity (e.g., 
Erikson, 1968). With respect to political activism, Braungart (1984) suggests that youth become 
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involved in political activism because they are between prescribed roles of child and adulthood 
and view activism as an opportunity to define a new role or identity. 
In addition to theory, some research has documented a positive association between age and 
political activism. For example, Pearce and Larson (2006) found age to be a significant predictor 
of involvement for 15-19-year-old American youth in a civic activism program. Similarly, civic 
knowledge, or knowledge of one’s country’s history and political structure, has also been shown 




 graders) (Hart, Atkins, Markey, 
and Youniss, 2004).  
These notions and findings notwithstanding, it is not clear if and to what degree 
chronological age will be relevant to explaining activism in the Intifada. Recently, many scholars 
have criticized the relevance of classic developmental theory given its foundation of Western 
thought. Western scholarly work on identity has focused primarily on an individual adolescent’s 
journey of self-discovery, with little attention to key cultural, historical, political, or religious 
influences on the development of adolescents’ identity in normative circumstances (B. B. Brown 
& Larson, 2002; Hammack, 2008), and on conflict youth in particular (Barber, 2008; 2009). 
Therefore, chronological age will be included as a control variable in the thesis’ analyses in order 
to partial out any variance that it might explain net of its correlation with other predictors, but 
given that theoretically it is of much less anticipated value in explaining activism than the 
economic, political, religious, and personal factors elaborated above, no specific hypothesis is 
advanced.  
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Summary of Hypotheses 
In sum, Palestinian women have a long history of political participation despite the cultural 
and religious scripts that limit female activism in the public sphere. Therefore the purpose of this 
thesis is to investigate the experience of female adolescents in zones of political conflict - 
specifically in the Gaza Strip during the first Intifada, and test if differences in levels of female 
participation in activist behaviors can be explained by their socioeconomic, religious, political, 
and individual characteristics. Based on a variety of theories, cultural and historical contexts, and 
previous research, specific hypothesis advanced in this thesis are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Socioeconomic status will be negatively associated with the political 
activism of Palestinian female youth.  
Hypothesis 1b: Socioeconomic status will be negatively associated more strongly with 
supportive forms of activism than with direct forms of activism.  
Hypothesis 2a: Religiosity will be negatively associated with the political activism of 
Palestinian female youth.  
Hypothesis 2b: Religiosity will be negatively associated more strongly with direct forms of 
activism than with supportive forms of activism.  
Hypothesis 3: Female youth who reported an affiliation with any political group will have 
higher levels of overall activism than female youth who reported no affiliation.   
Hypothesis 4a: Female youth who reported affiliation with the political group Fatah will 
have higher levels of both supportive and direct activism than their counterparts who reported 
affiliation with fundamentalist Islamic groups (Hamas and Islamic Jihad combined). 
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Hypothesis 4b: Identification with Fatah will predict higher levels of direct activism than 
supportive activism.  
Hypothesis 4c: Female youth who reported an affiliation with the Islamic groups will 
have higher levels of supportive activism than direct forms of activism.  
Hypothesis 4d: Female youth who reported an affiliation with the Islamic groups will 
have lower levels of supportive activism than females who reported an affiliation with Fatah.  
Hypothesis 4e: Religiosity will moderate the impact of religio-political affiliation, such 
that females who reported affiliation with the Islamic groups and reported high degrees of 
religiosity will have lower levels of overall activism compared to females who reported 
affiliation with the Islamic groups but reported low degrees of religiosity.   
Hypothesis 4f:  Identification with Fatah and reported high degrees of religiosity will be 
associated with lower levels of political activism than identification with Fatah and low degrees 
of religiosity. 
Hypothesis 4g: The moderating effect of religiosity will be more pronounced for 
affiliation with Islamic fundamental groups than with Fatah, such that the highest level of overall 
activism will be had by less religious, Fatah females, followed by, in descending order: highly 
religious Fatah females, less religious Islamic females, and highly religious Islamic females.  
Hypothesis 5a: Perceived group efficacy will be associated positively with political 
activism among Palestinian female youth. 
Hypothesis 5b: Perceived self efficacy will be associated positively with political 
activism among Palestinian female youth. 
See Figures 1 Appendix A for a graphic representation of the moderating model hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
Participants 
Data came from a representative sample of 383 Palestinian female youth from the Gaza Strip, 
who participated in the Adolescents and Political Violence Project (APVP), the intent of which 
was to assess the long-term impact of involvement in political violence on adolescents. (Barber, 
2008). APVP participants responded to a questionnaire that assessed demographics, 
victimization, activism, and a variety of measures of psychosocial functioning.  
The survey built on a previous survey study (Barber, 1999a, 2001) and interview work 
(Barber, 1999b, 2009) on Palestinian adolescents in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the West 
Bank.  The survey was written in English, back-translated into Arabic, and pilot tested with 
youth in the Gaza Strip several times before administration. The final version was administered 
in 1998 to 917 Palestinian youth (N=383 females), between the ages of 20-27-years-old, living in 
the Gaza Strip. This age range was chosen to ensure that the youth had lived through at least 
three years of the conflict during their teen years.  
Just over one-half of the female respondents (N = 193) were participants in the 8 United 
Nations Development Program centers in the Gaza Strip. All youth who were enrolled in the 
programs participated in the survey. The other half of the female respondents (N=188) were 
students in selected classes at the two major universities in the Gaza strip (Al Azhar University 
and Islamic University). All students present in those classes on the day of the survey 
administration completed the survey. No census data set was available in Gaza at the time of the 
survey that would have facilitated a truly representative sample. However, every effort was made 





education, employment, region of residence, type of residence (e.g., camp, village, town), 
political affiliation, etc. Relevant sample characteristics for female youth are reported in Table 1.  
Measures 
 The independent variables in this study were socioeconomic status, religiosity, political 
affiliation, religio-political affiliation, efficacy, and age. The dependent variable was political 
activism. The items used to measure each of the variables are described below.  
Dependent Variable: Political Activism 
The survey included 17 specific activism items that were identified from past literature 
on the Intifada and through extensive interviews with Palestinian youth (Barber, 1999b). 
Participants were asked “How often did you do the following things in conflict with Israeli 
soldiers?”  Responses ranged 1 never to 5 regularly. Additionally, participants were asked to 
tailor responses to the four time periods [“Before the Intifada,” “1
st
 two years of the Intifada 
(1988-1989),”  “Last three years of the Intifada (1990-1993),” and “After the Intifada].  In order 
to better assess the relationship between political activism and the independent variables and to 
fix the amount of time in which respondents were asked to report on activism experiences so as 
to control for opportunity to engage in activism [i.e., older youth had more opportunity (years) to 
engage than younger youth], responses from the third time period (“Last three years of the 
Intifada”) were used for analyses in this thesis. By using responses from the “Last three years of 
the Intifada,” greater variance in the distribution of the variables can be captured due to the 
increased length of time in which the respondents were retrospectively reporting (i.e., 2 years vs. 
3 years). Although the full, continuous response scales were employed in all analyses for this 
thesis, for insight into the degree of participation, percentages females who “ever participated”
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Table 1 Sample Characteristics 
Characteristics Range Average 
Age (years) 
Family size 
   Brothers  
   Sisters 
Marital Status 
    Single 
 
Religious Affiliation 
    Muslim 
 
Geographic distribution 
    Gaza Strip north 
    Gaza Strip central 
    Gaza Strip south 
 
Residence 
    Camp 
    Village 
    City/Town 
 
Standard of living 
    “Poorer than most” 
    “Richer than most” 
    Father employed in 1997 
 
Educational attainment 
    Finished secondary school 
    Completed university 
    Currently enrolled in university 
 
Employment 
    Employed “never” in 1997 
    Employed “very often” in 1997 
 
Political affiliation 
     No affiliation 
     Fatah 
     Hamas or Islamic Jihad 
     PLFP 












































during the third time period are also presented in Table 2. Means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 3. 
In previous analysis (Barber & Olsen, 2009) of the larger data set (both males and 
females), the seventeen items measuring political participation loaded on three primary factors. 
One set, labeled Direct Activism, included the items a, b, e, g, h, i, j, k, and l. All these items 
pertain to more direct forms of activism such as throwing stones, demonstrating, and erecting a 
Palestinian flag. Another set, Supportive Activism, consisted of items d, m, n, o, p, and q, and 
describe activities that are were not direct protest behavior, but rather, served other supportive 
functions such as caring for the wounded and visiting the family of a martyr. Finally, items c and 
f loaded on the third factor, Follow. These items refer to following instructions from the 
movement’s leadership that was written on walls or in leaflets that were distributed to the 
population, typically by youth. The scales were created by calculating averages for the third time 
period. Cronbach’s alpha for each of the scales were as follows: Direct Activism: 0.88; 
Supportive Activism: 0.85; Follow: 0.80.  
Given that those analyses aggregated male and female youth scores on these activism 
items, new exploratory analyses will be run to assess the factor structure for females only. For 
regression analysis, composite scores for each factor were created by taking the mean of the 
relevant items.  
Independent Variables 
The independent variables for this study were socioeconomic status, degree of religiosity, 
two forms of political affiliation (i.e., affiliated or not; and specific religio-political party 
affiliation), efficacy, and age. 
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 Table 2 Percentage of Females Who Ever (One or More Times) Participated during the Last 
Three Years of the Intifada 
 Percentage 
a. Demonstrate 
b. Distribute leaflets 
c. Obey leaflets 
d. Protect someone from IDF 
e. Write slogans  
f. Follow instructions from slogans  
g. Burn tires 
h. Erect barricades 
i. Throw stones 
j. Erect a Palestinian flag 
k. Throw Molotov cocktails 
l. Wear a mask 
m. Deliver supplies to participants 
n. Care for the wounded 
o. Try to distract soldiers  
p. Bring onions to help with the tear gas 





















Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations for Activism Items Reported During the Last Three 
Years of the Intifada 
 Mean N SD 
a. Demonstrate 
b. Distribute leaflets 
c. Obey leaflets 
d. Protect someone from IDF 
e. Write slogans  
f. Follow instructions from slogans  
g. Burn tires 
h. Erect barricades 
i. Throw stones 
j. Erect a Palestinian flag 
k. Throw Molotov cocktails 
l. Wear a mask 
m. Deliver supplies to participants 
n. Care for the wounded 
o. Try to distract soldiers  
p. Bring onions to help with the tear gas 























































Several measures of socioeconomic status are available in the data set. First, participants 
were asked to indicate if during the Intifada they primarily lived in a camp, village, or city/town. 
Generally, camp dwellers are considered to be the poorest, with village residents, somewhat 
better off and those living in cities or towns yet better off (Barber & Olson, 2009). Second, 
participants were also asked to indicate the highest level of education completed by their fathers 
and their mothers (Tables 4 and 5). For both questions, response scales ranged from1 no formal 
education to 11 Ph.D. degree.  Finally, participants were asked to indicate their perceived well-
being relative to other families they know, according to a 5-point response scale ranging from 1 
a lot poorer than most to 5 a little richer than most. (see Table 6). Exploratory factor, 
correlation, and reliability analyses were run to determine if these items can be used jointly in 
measuring socioeconomic status, or if one or more of them is better used independently. 
Regardless, higher scores indicated higher socioeconomic status.  
Religiosity 
Degree of religiosity was measured by five items which youth responded on a 5-point 
response scale ranging from 1 not at all to 5 every day relative to how often they engaged in that 
activity “during the past year..” Participants were asked to respond to four time periods (“Before 
the Intifada,” “1
st
 two years of the Intifada (1988-1989),”   “Last three years of the Intifada 
(1990-1993),” and “After the Intifada”). In order to be consistent with the time period used to 
assess political activism, for these analyses, responses from the third period (“Last three years of 
the Intifada) were used.  
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Table 4 Level of Paternal Education 
What is the highest level of education your father completed? (please circle one number) 
 
1. No formal education 
2. Elementary school 
3. Preparatory school 
4. Did not finish secondary school 
5. Finished secondary school 
6. Vocational training 
7. Some university 
8. BA degree 
9. Some graduate school 
10. MA degree 
11. Ph.D. degree 






Table 5 Level of Maternal Education 
What is the highest level of education your mother completed? (please circle one 
number) 
 
1. No formal education 
2. Elementary school 
3. Preparatory school 
4. Did not finish secondary school 
5. Finished secondary school 
6. Vocational training 
7. Some university 
8. BA degree 
9. Some graduate school 
10. MA degree 
11. Ph.D. degree 
12. I don’t know 
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Table 6 Perception of Relative Deprivation 
During the Intifada, how would you describe your family? (please circle one number) 
 
1. We were a lot poorer than most 
2. We were a little poorer than most 
3. We had about the same amount of money as most 
4. We were a little richer than most 
5. We were a lot richer than most 
 
 
Researchers have identified multiple dimensions of religiosity (see Chadwick & Top, 
1993; Cornwall & Thomas, 1990), and in previous analyses of these same data (but aggregated 
across male and female youth) these five items loaded on two factors, Public Religiosity and 
Private Religiosity (Barber & Olsen, 2009). Private Religiosity consisted of four items: “Pray 
alone,” “Read in the Koran,” “Think seriously about religion,” “Talk about religion with 
friends.” The fifth religiosity item, “Go to a Mosque to pray,” loaded on the Public Religiosity 
factor. Other items not used in this study (such as helped teach the Koran or Bible to others) 
comprised the measure of Public Religiosity in Barber and Olsen’s study. These additional items 
will not be used in these analyses since participants were not asked to report on their 
involvement in these forms of religiosity during the Intifada but rather after the Intifada.  
Cronbach’s alpha for the Private Religiosity scale was 67. This set of items was analyzed again 
using only the female youth data via exploratory factor analysis.  Since the purpose of this thesis 
is not to advance specific hypothesis regarding different dimensions of religiosity, but, rather, to 
assess the impact of religiosity (both private and public forms), in general, on activism, 
composite scores were formed from the mean of each item.  
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Political Affiliation  
Political affiliation was measured by one item: “Which of the following political groups 
do you belong?” Responses included belonging to no political group and a series of political 
parties operative in Gaza during the first Intifada. See Table 7. Participants were asked to 
indicate membership with a political group or no political group, for four time periods. In order 
to be consistent, responses from the third time period (“Last three years of the Intifada”) were 
used for analyses in this thesis. Additionally, not until the later three years of the Intifada did 
Hamas begin to emerge as a prominent Palestinian political group.  
To facilitate the creation of the two affiliation variables below, some recoding of this 
item will be conducted. Specifically, the political affiliation variable will be recoded, via 
orthogonal contrast coding, into a new variable (“Political Affiliation”) that includes the 
responses that received the most endorsement and to reflect the distinction between the secular 
and fundamentalist Islamic political groups: unaffiliated, Fatah, and Islamic (i.e., Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad aggregated). The non-designated groups will automatically be set to missing.  
Orthogonal contrast coding is utilized since it allows for direct comparisons between 
specified groups or combinations of groups. Specifically, items coded negatively will be 
compared to those coded positively, whereas, items coded zero will be ignored in the 
comparison. Since the sum of the codes across the groups must equal zero, the recoding of 
variables in this analysis reflect a zero sum (see codes below) (Cohen et al., 2003). 
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Table 7 Political Affiliation Responses 
Which of the following political groups did you belong?  
 
1. I belonged to no political group 
2. Fatah 
3. Hamas 
4. Islamic Jihad 
5. PLFP 
6. DFLP 
7. Arab Liberation Front 
8. Palestine Liberation Front 




 Affiliation vs. Non-Affiliation  
 To test the hypotheses relative to affiliation (N = 170) versus non-affiliation (N =173) 
(regardless of political party), the recoded “Political Affiliation” variable was dichotomized to 
reflect those females that reported no affiliation and those that reported affiliation with secular 
(Fatah) or fundamentalist, Islamic political groups (Hamas, and Islamic Jihad).  Unaffiliated will 
be set to -2, whereas secular and fundamentalist groups were each set to +1. 
Religio-Political Affiliation  
To test the hypotheses relative to differences between the secular (N = 98) and 
fundamentalist Islamic groups (N = 72), the “Political Affiliation” variable was recoded to reflect 
the contrast, with unaffiliated being set to zero (i.e., not used in the comparison), Fatah set to +1, 




 Efficacy was measured by ten items assessing participants’ appraisal of their ability and 
the Palestinian people’s ability to succeed in the first Intifada. See Table 8 for a full list of items. 
Participants responded to the stem: “How much would you agree with the following thoughts?” 
A 5-point response scale was used that ranged from 1 strongly disagree, to 5 strongly agree for 
two time periods: “1
st
 two years of the Intifada (1988-1989)” and “Last three years of the Intifada 
(1990-1993).” Again to achieve consistency among the time periods used to measure each 
variable, the second time period (“Last three years of the Intifada”) will be used for analyses.  
Exploratory factor analysis will be used to establish the most parsimonious set of items to be 
used. Items a, b, and c were expected to measure group efficacy, while items d, e, f, g, h, i, and j 
are expected to measure self-efficacy, not to be analyzed as separate items, but as a measure of 
overall efficacy. Exploratory factor analysis was used to determine if these items represent the 
same latent construct. A composite score for both group efficacy and self efficacy was computed 
by taking the mean of the set of items.  
Age  
Age was assessed with the question “How old are you?” Respondents indicated their age 
according to a scale that ranged from 15-30-years.  
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Table 8 Efficacy Items  
How much would you agree with the following thoughts?  
1. Strongly disagree            4.   Agree 
2. Disagree                          5.   Strongly Agree 
3. Neither agree or disagree 
 
a. The struggle was hopeless 
b. The Intifada was successful 
c. The Intifada was worth the effort 
d. I felt I could accomplish anything as a person 
e. I felt like giving up 
f. I felt I could carry the struggle on forever 
g. I was confident about the future 
h. I was worried about the future 
i. I felt like I could make a real difference 
j. I felt like I was helping to make history 
 
Analysis 
 Analyses to assess the measurement properties of all of the study’s variables are 
described above. The associations between the constructs of interest were tested first via 
bivariate correlations. Next, hierarchical regression analyses were used to test the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables, separately for supportive and direct activism. 
In the main effects model, age was be entered first, followed by socioeconomic status, group 
efficacy, self efficacy, political affiliation, religio-political affiliation, and religiosity. Each 
variable was entered separately in sequential linear regression. The same steps were used to enter 
the variables in the moderating model as in the main effects model, except that in a third step a 
variable representing the interaction of religio-political affiliation and religiosity was added. This 
interaction variable was the product of the two variables, after religiosity is centered.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Four types of analyses were conducted for this thesis. First, missing data analyses were 
conducted to examine patterns of missing data. Next, exploratory factor analysis was used to 
determine the composition of scales. Finally, correlation and regression analyses were utilized to 
address this study’s hypotheses. The remainder of this section will present the results from each 
analysis.   
Missing Data 
Before creating scale scores for the study variables the data were inspected for patterns of 
missing values. Overall, there were moderate levels of missing data. Specifically, for 26 of the 
38 items used in the various models, more than 5% of the data were missing. For most of the 
items, missing data ranged from 5.5% to 7%. The highest percentages of missing data were for 
two items:  “Go to the Mosque to pray” (9.1% missing) and “Obey leaflets” (10.2% missing). 
Otherwise, for 10 cases there were missing data on two items. For 5 of these cases, the missing 
data were for the items: “Write slogans” and “I felt I could accomplish anything as a person.”  
For the additional 5 cases, there were missing data for the items: “The Intifada was successful” 
and “Obey leaflets.” All other patterns of missing data applied to less than five cases. Due to this 
moderate level of missing data Expectation Maximization (EM) imputation methods were used 
at the item level, except for categorical items (i.e., political affiliation, place of residence, and 
religio-political affiliation) since EM does not accurately impute categorical items.    
After imputation on the item level and creating scale scores for socioeconomic status, 
religiosity, self and group efficacy, and supportive and direct activism (see below for a 
description of scales), missing data analyses were conducted again, but this time on the variable 
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level to examine any patterns of missing data, with specific attention to categorical variables. 
Overall, there were very low levels of missing data for the scale scores. All but three of the 
variables or scale scores had 0% missing data. The three variables that had missing data were 
“Political affiliation” (affiliation vs. non-affiliation), “Religio-political affiliation” (affiliation 
with a specific political party), and “Place of residence”. Due to the nature of contrast coding, 
responses other than “No affiliation,” “Affiliation with Fatah,” “Affiliation with Hamas,” or 
“Affiliation with Islamic Jihad” were set to missing. In total there were 38 missing data for these 
two variables making the percentage of missing data 10%. Due to the intentional nature of the 
missing data for these two variables (i.e., this author recoded responses to reflect missing data) 
and the extremely low level of missing data for “Place of residence” (.8%), imputation methods 
were not used for scale level variables. Instead Listwise Deletion methods were implemented. 
Thus the final number of participants was 336. 
Measurement Model 
 Exploratory factor analysis was used to assess the fit of the proposed measurement 
models for the independent variables and dependent variable. Principal axis factoring extraction 
with oblique rotation was used in all exploratory factor analyses.  Results of the measurement 
models are discussed below.  
Socioeconomic Status (SES) 
 The four items used to measure socioeconomic status were tested via exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA). EFA resulted in one factor. Cronbach’s alpha for these four items was .56, too 
low to justify aggregating the four items into one scale. Since mother’s level of education and 
father’s level of education were correlated at .61, these two items were transformed into one 
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composite variable by taking the mean of each item. The remaining two items (place of residence 
and perception of deprivation compared to peers) were used as independent measures of 
socioeconomic status with place of residence dummy coded so that living in a refugee camp was 
the reference group and living in a village and living in a city/town were the comparison groups. 
These three separate measures of SES (the composite variable, place of residence, and perception 
of deprivation) were entered simultaneously in the second block of the subsequent hierarchical 
regression analyses. 
Religiosity 
 First, EFA was used to analyze all five items. These analyses revealed a two factor 
solution. The first factor was comprised of the single item “Go to the Mosque to pray” and was 
labeled Public Religiosity. The second factor was comprised of the items “Read the Koran,” 
“Thought about religion,” and “Talked about religion” and was labeled Private Religiosity. The 
item “Pray alone” did not clearly belong to either of the two factors as seen by the relatively 
equal split loading across the two factors, and therefore was dropped as a measure of religiosity. 
 EFA was run a second time with four items (without “Pray alone”) and indicated a one 
factor solution. While the item “Go to the Mosque to Pray” loaded with the three other items on 
one factor, its value was too low (.354) to justify including in along with the other items in one 
measure of religiosity. Additionally, based on previous analyses (Barber & Olson, 2009) “Go to 
the Mosque to Pray” was identified as an indicator of Public Religiosity while the other items 
were measures of Private Religiosity. Therefore, the final measure of religiosity includes three 
items “Read the Koran,” “Thought about religion,” and “Talked about religion.” Cronbach’s 
alpha for these items was .79. 
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Efficacy 
 EFA of the combined set of self and group efficacy items resulted in a three factor 
solution. The first factor was composed of the items “I could accomplish anything,” “I could 
carry on the struggle forever,” “I am confident about the future,” “I could make a difference,” “I 
was helping to make history” and was labeled Self Efficacy. The second factor was comprised of 
the items “The Intifada was successful” and “The Intifada was worth the effort” and was labeled 
Group Efficacy. The third factor was comprised of the items “Felt like giving up,” “Struggle was 
hopeless,” and “Worried about the future” and was labeled Negative Appraisal. 
 Based on the purposes of examining the relationship between the concepts of self 
efficacy and group efficacy and activism, EFA was run a second time without the negative 
appraisal items. The results of the second factor analysis indicated that the item “I could 
accomplish anything” had a loading that was less than .300, whereas the other items measuring 
Self Efficacy had loadings of .600 or higher. Therefore, based on statistical guidance, the final 
measure of Self Efficacy includes four items: “I could carry on the struggle forever,” “I am 
confident about the future,” “I could make a difference,” “I was helping to make history.” Group 
Efficacy consists of the items “The Intifada was successful” and “The Intifada was worth the 
effort.” Cronbach’s alpha for Self Efficacy was .75 and the correlation between the two items 
used to measure Group Efficacy was .62 
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Activism 
 In previous EFA analyses of the same set of activism items (Barber & Olsen, 2009) three 
factors were identified in both the male and female data. The three factors were labeled Support, 
Direct, and Follow. EFA analyses from this thesis used only the female responses and generally 
replicated those factors identified in Barber and Olsen’s study.   
For these analyses, EFA of the combined set of activism items resulted in a four-factor 
solution. The first factor was comprised of the items “Demonstrate,” “Distribute leaflets,” “Burn 
tires,” “Erect barricades,” “Throw stones,” “Erect flag,” and “Throw Molotov cocktail,” and was 
labeled Direct Activism. The second factor was comprised of the items “Protect someone from 
Israeli soldier,” Deliver supplies to Palestinian fighters,” “Care for the wounded,” “Distract 
soldiers,” “Bring onions,” and “Visit the family of a martyr,” and was labeled Supportive 
Activism.  The third factor included the items “Obey leaflets” and “Follow instructions” and was 
labeled Follow. Finally, the fourth factor included the items “Write slogans” and “Wear a mask” 
and was labeled Extreme Direct Activism since these two forms of behavior were particularly 
risky. Writing slogans was a primary means of communicating directives from political 
leadership and the IDF was particularly harsh on those who did so. Wearing a mask indicated 
that the IDF had already apprehended the individual who wore the mask to conceal this 
familiarity. Both forms of behavior were typically committed by male, and not female, youth 
(Barber, forthcoming).  
An inspection of the frequencies of these variables confirmed that, in fact, few females in 
this sample did engage in Extreme Direct Activism. Results showed that 96% of the females 
reported that they never wrote slogans and 95.4% reported that they never wore a mask. Due to 
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the low prevalence of these types of activism in this sample, the two items were dropped from 
further analyses. In addition, the two items “Burn tires” and Throw Molotov cocktails” were also 
dropped from analyses also due to low prevalence (93% and 95% respectively reported never 
engaging in these forms of activism).  
 The final measurement, then, of  Supportive Activism consisted of the eight items: 
“Obeying leaflets,” “Protecting someone from an Israeli soldier,” “Following instructions,” 
“Delivering supplies to Palestinian fighters,” “Caring for the wounded,” “Distracting soldiers,” 
“Bring onions to Palestinian fighters,” and “Visiting the family of a martyr.” (Note: The two 
items “Obeying leaflets” and “Following instructions” loaded on the Follow factor. However for 
the purposes of these analyses, these two items were used to create a composite measure of 
Supportive Activism.) Cronbach’s alpha for Supportive Activism was .86. The measurement of 
Direct Activism consisted of the five items: “Demonstrating,” “Distributing leaflets,” “Erecting 
barricades,” “Throwing stones,” and “Erecting a Palestinian flag.” Cronbach’s alpha for Direct 
Activism was .91. 
Correlations 
Bivariate correlations were calculated among all of the study variables. The coefficients 
are reported in Table 9. Correlations amongst the predictor variables provide insights into the 
lives of Palestinian young women in the first Intifada. For example, efficacy (group and self) was 
significantly and positively correlated with religiosity suggesting that Palestinian young women 
who were highly religious were also highly efficacious. Palestinian young women who were self 
efficacious were also more likely to be affiliated with a political party, than those with low levels 
of self efficacy. However, being highly religious was significantly correlated with belonging to 
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fundamental Islamic political groups (i.e., Hamas and Islamic Jihad). Additionally, young 
women who lived in a refugee camp were older and reported less relative economic well-being 
than those young women living in a city or town. Furthermore, as expected, the two forms of 
activism were significantly, positively correlated.  
In terms of what was expected, lower levels of parental education and living in a refugee 
camp (SES) were negatively correlated with both forms of activism (direct and support) 
supporting expectations that Palestinian female activists came from a lower socioeconomic status 
than non-activists. Additionally, these young women who participated in both kinds of activism 
had higher levels of group and self efficacy, were more religious, and were more likely to be 
affiliated with a political party than those young women who reported little to no activism. 
Correlations between higher degrees of efficacy and activism and political affiliation and 
efficacy were in the expected direction, while the correlations between religiosity and activism 
were in the opposite direction as hypothesized. Moreover, age was positively related specifically 
to supportive activism, whereas, as expected, religio-political affiliation was related specifically 
to direct activism. Thus those young women who engaged in supportive activism were older, 
whereas those who engaged in direct activism were more likely to be affiliated with Fatah than 
their counterparts. 
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.602**            
Group 
Efficacy 
.279** .155**           
Self 
Efficacy 
.284** .279** .361**          
Religiosity .327** .155** .283** .210**         
Political 
Affiliation 




.008 .151** -.068 .000 .155* .106       
Parental 
Education 
-.206** -.114* -.109* -.032 -.091 -.141* .043      
City -.156** -.114* .042 .008 .023 -.138 -.071 .216**     
Village -.062 -.001 -.004 .069 -.002 .085 -.004 -.029 -.276**    
Camp .191** .114* -.039 -.118* -.011 .088 .073 -.199** -.839** -.293**   
Relative 
Depriv. 
-.049 -.034 -.082 -.045 -.077 .052 .087 .199** .153** -.019 -141*  
Age .357** .066 .052 .007 .093 .071 -.003 -.313** -.173** -.001 .178** -.072 
 ** Correlations  Significant at the .01 Level (2 tailed) 
 *Correlations Significant at the .05 Level (2 tailed) 
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Regression 
Hierarchical regression analysis with main effects was used to examine the association 
between age, socioeconomic status, efficacy, political affiliation (affiliation with any party), 
religio-political affiliation (affiliation with a specific political party), religiosity and supportive 
and direct activism. Additionally, the effect of the interaction between religio-political affiliation 
and religiosity on activism was examined. For the analyses of main effects, variables were 
entered in the following sequence: Block 1: age; Block 2: SES variables (parental education, 
place of residence, and relative deprivation); Block 3: self efficacy; Block 4: group efficacy; 
Block 5: affiliation with any political party; Block 6: affiliation with a specific political party 
(religio-political affiliation); and Block 7: religiosity. For analyses of moderating models, 
variables were entered in the following sequence: Block 1: age, SES, self efficacy, group 
efficacy, and political affiliation; Block 2: religio-political affiliation and religiosity; Block 3: 
interaction term of religiosity and religio-political affiliation. Each regression model was run 
twice, once with supportive activism and a second time with direct activism as the dependent 
variable. See tables 10 and 11 for the results of the regression analyses for the main effects 
models of supportive activism and direct activism respectively. See table 12 for the results of the 
moderating model for supportive activism, and 13 for the results of the moderating model for 
direct activism. 
Overall, the results showed that the variables used to predict activism were effective in 
explaining both supportive and direct activism. For example, self efficacy, political affiliation, 
and religiosity were all significantly related to both forms of activism at the multivariate level, as 
well as the bivariate level (see Correlations section). Age and socioeconomic status were 
significantly predictive only of supportive activism whereas religio-political affiliation was 
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Table 10 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting 
Supportive Activism (Main Effects Model) (N = 338) 
Variable B SE B β ∆R
2
 F 
Block 1  
   Age .084 .015 .265** .131** 50.522** 
Block 2                                                 .028**                    2.744** 
   Parental Education  -.027 .023 -.059 
  
   Relative 
   Deprivation .066 .102   .030 
   Village
a
  -.413 .160 -.122* 
   City/Town
b
  -.254 .099 -.127* 
Block 3  
   Self Efficacy .181 .054  .164** .080**  35.304** 
Block 4      
   Group Efficacy .150 .054  .136** .026**  11.832** 
Block 5  
   Affiliation
c
 .113 .031  .170** .024**  11.080** 
Block 6  
   Religio-Political 
   Affiliation
d
 .050 .065  .035 .000                   .000 
Block 7  
   Religiosity .317 .058  .258** .060**     29.966** 
    R2 F 
    .349**     15.260** 
     aVillage: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group 
     bCity/Town: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group 
        c
Affiliation: -2 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with a political group 
        d
Religio-Political Affiliation: -1 = affiliation with Islamic political groups,  0 = no political 
      affiliation,  1 = affiliation with Fatah 



















Table 11 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Direct 
Activism (Main Effects Model) (N = 338) 
Variable B SE B β ∆R
2
 F 
Block 1  
   Age -.005 .015 -.016 .003 1.134 
Block 2                                                 .022                         1.807 
   Parental Education -.018 .023 -.042 
  
   Relative 
   Deprivation  .033 .104  .316 
   Village
a
 -.208 .164 -.067 
   City/Town
b
 -.224 .101 -.123* 
Block 3  
   Self Efficacy  .243 .055  .243**  .091**  34.104** 
Block 4      
   Group Efficacy  .023 .055  .023  .001 .329 
Block 5  
   Affiliation
c
  .114 .031  .189**  .035** 13.697** 
Block 6  
   Religio-Political 
   Affiliation
d
  .187 .067 .144* .016* 6.220* 
Block 7  
   Religiosity  .132 .059 .118* .012* 4.964* 
    R2 F 
     .180**  6.120** 
     aVillage: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group 
     bCity/Town: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group 
        c
Affiliation: -2 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with a political group 
        d
Religio-Political Affiliation: -1 = affiliation with Islamic political groups,  0 = no political 
      affiliation, 1 = affiliation with Fatah 




Table 12  Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting 
Supportive Activism (Moderating Model) (N = 336) 
Variable B SE B β ∆R
2
 F 
Block 1     .290** 16.776** 
   Age .084 .015  .264** 
  
   Parental Education  -.029 .023 -.062 
   Relative 
   Deprivation .072 .102  .032 
   Village
a
  -.417 .160 -.123* 
   City/Town
b
  -.253 .099 -.126* 
   Self Efficacy .179 .054  .163** 
   Group Efficacy .146 .054  .133** 
   Affiliation
c
 .109 .031  .165** 
Block 2     .060** 15.024** 
   Religio-Political .285 .290  .220 
     Affiliation
d
    
   Religiosity .328 .059  .267** 
Block 3      
   Religio-Political   
-.064 .077 -.168  .001 .692     Affiliation x 
   Religiosity 
    R
2
 F 
     .351** 13.947** 
Note: Religiosity was centered at its mean 
a
Village: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group 
b
City/Town: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group 
c
Affiliation: -2 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with a political group 
d
Political Party: -1 = affiliation with Islamic political groups,  0 = no political affiliation,  
 1 = affiliation with Fatah 




Table 13 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting 
Direct Activism (Moderating Model) (N = 336) 
Variable B SE B β ∆R
2
 F 
Block 1    .152** 7.366** 
   Age  -.005 .015 -.019 
  
   Parental Education  -.020 .023 -.047 
   Relative 
   Deprivation   .042 .104  .021 
   Village
a
  -.213 .164 -.069 
   City/Town
b
  -.222 .101 -.122* 
   Self Efficacy   .240 .054  .240** 
   Group Efficacy   .017 .055  .017** 
   Affiliation
c
   .109 .032  .180** 
Block 2    .028** 5.630** 
   Religio-Political   .551 .296  .426 
     Affiliation
d
    
   Religiosity   .149 .061 .133* 
Block 3      
   Religio-Political   
 -.100 .079  -.286  .004          1.596     Affiliation x 
   Religiosity 
    R
2
 F 
    .184** 5.741** 
Note: Religiosity was centered at its mean 
a
Village: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group 
b
City/Town: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group 
c
Affiliation: -2 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with a political group 
d
Political Party: -1 = affiliation with Islamic political groups,  0 = no political affiliation, 1 
= affiliation with Fatah 
*p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01. 
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predictive only of direct activism. Socioeconomic status was, however, significantly related to 
direct activism at the bivariate level (see Correlation section). The main difference between the 
two forms of activism was the percentage of variance in activism explained by the independent 
variables in each model. While the main effects model explained 35% of the variance for  
supportive activism and 18% of the variance for direct activism, the difference between these 
two percentages can almost entirely be accounted for by age. The remainder of this section will 
discuss the results of each independent variable and whether the stated hypotheses were 
supported or contradicted. 
Age 
Although no specific hypothesis was advanced for the relationship between age and 
activism due to criticism of the use of Western notions of chronological age in non-Western 
societies, age was included in the models for this study. The results showed that when 
controlling for socioeconomic status, efficacy, religiosity, political affiliation and religio-political 
affiliation (i.e., all other independent variable), age was significantly, positively associated with 
supportive activism (β = .265, t = 5.557, p < .01), such that older Palestinian females were more 
likely to engage in supportive activism than younger females. However, age was not 
significantly associated with direct activism. 
Socioeconomic Status 
 In support of Hypothesis 1a which suggested that socioeconomic status would be 
negatively associated with activism, the results indicated that socioeconomic status was 
significantly and negatively related to both forms of activism. Specifically, while controlling for 
all other independent variables, Palestinian young women who lived in refugee camps (where 
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economic well-being is typically lower than in the other settings) were more likely to engage in 
supportive activism than those young women who lived in a city (β = -.127, t = -2.573, p < .05) 
or village (β = -.122, t = -2.580, p < .05). Additionally Palestinian female youth who lived in a 
refugee camp were more likely to engage in direct activism than those living in a city or town (β 
= -.123, t = -2.101, p < .05). 
In support of Hypothesis 1b which suggested that socioeconomic status would be more 
negatively associated with supportive activism than direct activism,  the block of SES variables 
explained significant variance in supportive activism (R
2
 = .159, ∆F = 2.744, p < .01). However, 
only one specific component of the block (place of residence) had a statistically significant main 
effect on direct activism. Although the specific index of SES, (i.e., living in a city or town) was 
significantly predictive, when controlling for other independent variables, (β = -.123, t = -2.101, 
p < .05), the block of SES variables did not explain significant variance (R
2
 = .025, ∆F = 1.807, p 
= n.s.). Therefore the results confirm Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b. 
Religiosity 
 Contrary to Hypotheses 2a which stated that religiosity would be negatively associated 
with activism and Hypotheses 2b which stated that religiosity would be associated more strongly 
(but still have a negative relationship) with direct activism than supportive activism, when 
controlling for age, socioeconomic status, efficacy, political affiliation and religio-political 
affiliation, religiosity was positively associated with both supportive (β = .258, t = 5.481, p < 
.01) and direct activism (β = .118, t = 2.228, p < .05). Specifically, Palestinian female youth who 
reported being more religious were more likely to participate in both supportive and direct forms 
of activism than those young women who were less religious.  
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Political Affiliation 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3 which stated that Palestinian female youth who reported 
affiliation with a political party would have higher levels of overall activism than those who 
reported no affiliation, affiliation with a political party was significantly and positively related to 
both supportive activism (β = .170, t = 3.672, p < .01) and direct (β = .189, t = 3.632, p < .01) 
activism when controlling for all other independent variables. Specifically, Palestinian female 
youth who belonged to a political party, regardless of the political party, were more likely than 
their peers who reported no political affiliation to engage in both forms of activism.  
Religio-Political Affiliation 
In additional to political affiliation, affiliation with a specific political party, or religio-
political affiliation, was predictive of activism. Hypotheses were advanced which distinguished 
different activism levels depending on affiliation with secular (Fatah) or fundamentalist Islamic 
groups (Hamas or Islamic Jihad). First the hypotheses which propose a relationship between 
being affiliated with Fatah and activism will be compared to the results, followed by the results 
of the relationship between being affiliated with fundamentalist Islamic groups and activism. 
Affiliation with Fatah 
Hypothesis 4a stated that female youth who reported affiliation with Fatah would have 
higher levels of both supportive activism and direct activism than those who were affiliated with 
Islamic groups. When controlling for all other independent variables, results indicated partial 
support for this hypothesis in that affiliation with Fatah (as compared to the fundamentalist 
Islamic parties of Hamas and Islamic Jihad) was predictive of direct forms of activism (β = .144, 
t = 2.808, p < .05) but not predictive of supportive activism (β = .035, t = .761, p = n.s.). 
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Hypothesis 4b which stated that identification with Fatah would predict higher levels of direct 
activism than supportive activism, however, was fully supported. Therefore both young women 
who were affiliated with Fatah as well as those who were affiliated with fundamentalist Islamic 
groups engaged in supportive activism, whereas it was distinctly Fatah girls who engaged in 
direct activism. 
Affiliation with fundamentalist, Islamic groups 
In addition to hypotheses (Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b) of the relationship between 
affiliation with Fatah and activism, hypotheses of the relationship between affiliation with 
fundamentalist Islamic groups and activism were advanced. Specifically, Hypothesis 4c 
proposed that Palestinian female youth who reported affiliation with Islamic groups (N=72) 
would have higher levels of supportive activism than direct forms of activism. An examination 
of the mean levels of activism for young women who reported belonging to Islamic groups show 
that girls who belonged to Islamic political groups did in fact report more involvement in 
supportive activism (M = 2.741, SD = .959) than direct activism (M = 1.866, SD = .827), thus 
supporting Hypothesis 4c.  
Additionally, Hypotheses 4d stated that those who were affiliated with fundamentalist 
Islamic groups would report lower levels of supportive activism than those affiliated with Fatah 
was not supported since affiliation with a specific political party was not predictive of supportive 
activism (β = .035, t = .761, p = n.s.). Therefore, even though Palestinian young women who 
were affiliated with fundamentalist Islamic groups and Fatah both engaged in supportive 
activism, these youth who belonged to Islamic groups engaged in supportive forms of activism 
more so than direct activism. 
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The Moderating Model: Religiosity and Religio-Political Affiliation 
The hypotheses that religiosity would moderate the relationship between activism and 
religio-political affiliation (Hypotheses 4e, 4f, and 4g) were not supported. When controlling for 
age, socioeconomic status, efficacy, religiosity, political affiliation, and religio-political 
affiliation, the interaction effects were non significant for both supportive (β = -.168, t = -.832, p 
= n.s.) and direct activism (β = -.286, t = -1.263, p = n.s.) as shown in Tables 12 and 13. Thus, 
regardless of level of religiosity Palestinian young women who were affiliated with Fatah were 
more likely to engage in direct activism than those affiliated with fundamentalist Islamic groups, 
whereas both those affiliated with Fatah and Islamic groups engaged in supportive activism.  
Efficacy 
 In support of Hypotheses 5a and 5b which stated that both self (Hypothesis 5a) and group 
(Hypothesis 5b) would be predictive of political activism, group and self efficacy were positively 
related to activism. When controlling for all other independent variables, both self efficacy (β = 
.164, t = 3.351, p < .01) and group efficacy (β = .136, t = 2.798, p < .01) were significantly 
associated with supportive forms of activism. However only self efficacy was associated with 




CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 In more than 30 countries around the world war or political violence is a daily experience 
for many youth. Despite the numbers of young people who are affected by political violence, 
relatively little is known about their experiences; a fact that is even more so true for female 
youth. Of the studies that do exist, the focus is either on risk factors for involvement in armed 
groups (i.e., child soldiering) or the effects of exposure to political violence (i.e., PTSD, 
depression, and anxiety) and not on motivations for participating in political activism during a 
war or other politically-related conflict. This lacuna in the literature is particularly unfortunate 
given that in some conflicts high numbers of female youth have engaged in political activism, 
such as the first Palestinian Intifada against Israel (1987-1993; see Barber, 2001; Barber & 
Olsen, 2009), as well as across the history of the Palestinians generally (Peteet, 2001, 2006). 
Specifically, little is known about these young women who defied cultural and gender norms by 
engaging in activism in public arenas, spaces often reserved for men since women are restricted 
to the private or home sphere.  
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis was to investigate predictors of political activism 
among Palestinian female youth in the first Intifada. Relevant theory from sociology (i.e., 
Relative Deprivation Theory), political science (i.e., Political Stabilization Theory) and 
psychology (i.e., Collective Identity, and classic identity theory), as well as the literature on civic 
engagement in peaceful nations, was examined to identify hypothesized predictors of activism. 
In particular, it was expected that: 1) socioeconomic status would be negatively related to 
activism, specifically supportive activism; 2) religiosity would also be negatively related to 
activism, specifically direct activism; 3) affiliation with a political group would be positively 
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related to activism; 4) affiliation with the secular political group Fatah would be associated with 
increased engagement in activism more so than affiliation with fundamentalists Islamic political 
groups, specifically for direct activism; 5) affiliation with fundamentalists Islamic groups would 
be associated with higher levels of supportive activism than direct activism; 6) religiosity would 
moderate the relationship between religio-political affiliation and activism; and 7) efficacy, both 
self efficacy and group efficacy, would be positively  associated with activism. Even though no 
specific hypothesis was advanced for age (see discussion of age in chapter 2 for an explanation 
of the lack of hypothesis), theory and previous literature suggested the inclusion of this variable 
in the overall model. 
As to the findings, the bivariate level analyses confirmed a number of hypotheses in that 
Palestinian female youth who engaged in supportive forms of activism (e.g., bringing supplies to 
Palestinian male fighters, visiting the family of a martyr, etc.) were older, poorer, more self 
efficacious, believed the Intifada could bring about positive changes for Palestinians (group 
efficacy), and were affiliated with both secular (Fatah) and fundamentalist Islamic (Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad) political parties. Similarly bivariate correlations showed that those who engaged 
in direct activism (e.g., throwing stones, erecting barricades, etc.) were also poorer, more self 
and group efficacious, and belonged to a political party. However, for direct activism these girls 
were not affiliated with just any political party; but rather belonged to the secular Fatah party. 
Contrary to what was hypothesized, those who engaged in both supportive and direct activism 
were more, rather than less, religious than their less-active counterparts. 
The multivariate level analyses confirmed many of the relationships evident at the 
bivariate level and thereby underscored the importance of those predictor variables by indicating 
that they retained unique predictive power even when combined with the full set of other 
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predictor variables. For example, for supportive activism the hierarchical regression analyses 
mirrored the bivariate findings and thereby revealed that age, SES, self and group efficacy, 
political affiliation, and religiosity all explained unique portions of the variance. Similarly, for 
direct activism, except for group efficacy which was no longer significant at the multivariate 
level, the regressions revealed that SES, self efficacy, political affiliation, religio-political 
affiliation, and religiosity explained unique variance. In sum, the multivariate regressions 
confirmed that with the exception of age and group efficacy (both of which predicted only 
supportive activism), both forms of political activism were significantly predicted by the 
hypothesized set of economic, individual, political, and religious variables studied in these 
analyses. 
The remainder of this section will be devoted to discussing the findings specifically for 
each variable in more detail in the following order: age, efficacy, socioeconomic status, 
religiosity, political affiliation, and, religio-political affiliation. This order was elected in order to 
progressively focus on the predictors that offered the most insight into explaining activism.  
Age 
First, in regards to age, no hypothesis was advanced for the relationship between age and 
activism. This was so because it is not clear how relevant age-related issues of development are 
to the population under study. Specifically, there has been much recent criticism that Western 
scholars have unduly emphasized the intra-psychic components of identity thought to be 
operative during the adolescent years (e.g., crisis and commitment; e.g., Marcia, 1993), and have 
correspondingly paid inadequate attention to the broader historical, cultural, and social forces 
that shape identity among youth in much of the world that may or may not operate 
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predominantly during the teen years. Thus, it was unclear if chronological age would have any 
particular power in explaining the activist behavior of the young female Palestinians.  The results 
proved otherwise, however, at least for explaining supportive activism. Specifically, the older the 
females were, the more likely they were to have engaged in supportive forms of activism.  
A possible interpretation of this finding may lie in the gendered significance of 
supportive activism. In some ways supportive activism can be viewed as consistent with cultural 
norms and, specifically, as gendered in nature. For example, caring for the wounded, bringing 
supplies to fighters, and protecting someone from Israeli soldiers are gendered tasks (Naaman, 
2007). As these young Palestinian girls aged and became young women, it is plausible to assume 
that it was expected for them to act in accordance with the gendered roles that are common 
within the Palestinian society. If it is culturally appropriate for Palestinian women to be the 
caregivers of the family and greater society, then it would be understandable for older Palestinian 
females to engage in more caretaking tasks (i.e., supportive activism). Additionally, these 
supportive acts may signal not just the compliance with gender norms, but also the development 
of an identity that encompasses service to the common good or social agenda; an identity that is 
culturally appropriate within the Palestinian society. It is important to note, however, that 
identity was not measured specifically in this thesis, and therefore references to identity 
formation of Palestinian female youth are purely speculative Nonetheless, aging, in the 
chronological sense, may be a time for these young women to begin to take on roles and 
behaviors that are consistent with cultural gendered scripts as well as develop a culturally 




Contrary to age, specific hypotheses were advanced for the relationship between self and 
group efficacy and activism as a means of measuring individual characteristic that might account 
for differing degrees of activism. These hypotheses were influenced by Collective Identity 
Theory, which suggests that identification with a disadvantaged group with little or no 
opportunity to become part of the advantaged group, as well as the perceived efficacy of the 
self’s and group’s ability to obtain stated goals, are predictive of collective action (Klandermans, 
1984). Previous literature (i.e., Zomeren et al., 2008; Taylor, 1999; Brown & Ferguson, 1995) 
has documented the pre-requisite of self efficacy and group efficacy on future political action. 
The significant prediction of political activism by both self and group efficacy in this 
study not only adds general support for Collective Identity Theory but it does so by illustrating 
its relevance in a context not previously studied. Specifically, much of the work that has 
informed the theory has been conducted in countries at peace, such as the Netherlands and 
Australia.(e.g., Zomeren et al., 2008; Taylor, 1999; Brown & Ferguson, 1995). The results of this 
thesis provide evidence that the same principles of efficacy are operative also among females in 
the highly dynamic and volatile context of political violence.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, these findings suggest that despite age, poverty 
and religious and political influences (i.e., other variables included in these analyses), Palestinian 
female youth didn’t necessarily engaged blindly in activism simply as a response to societal 
demands to “join the cause.” Rather, it appears that they might also have evaluated whether their 
participation would produce anticipated outcomes as well as whether they might find personal 
meaning in the conflict. This cognitive deliberation about whether or not and why one 
participates in risky, political activism suggests a more active and agentic role of young 
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Palestinian females (and possibly Palestinian male youth as well) than is typically accorded 
adolescents. Thus, rather than performing behaviors simply reactively due to the pressure of 
religious or political influences or environmental circumstances (e.g., poverty) the more 
politically active young Palestinian women appeared to have appraised the utility or efficacy of 
involvement for themselves and for their society. This finding is consistent with Taylor (1999) 
and Brown and Ferguson (1995) who noted that efficacy is necessary for women to break 
traditional and cultural norms.  
 Socioeconomic Status 
In addition to efficacy and age, the findings in regarding socioeconomic status and 
activism also provided insights into the phenomenon of political activism among Palestinian 
female youth during the first Intifada. Since previous literature has documented the link between 
socioeconomic status and political involvement by identifying poverty as a risk factor for 
involvement in armed groups among girl soldiers (Kearins, 2002), and, theory, such as Relative 
Deprivation Theory, suggests the importance of socioeconomic status or economic disadvantage 
as a driving force for activism (Gurr, 1970; Wilkinson, 2004), it was, therefore, expected that 
socioeconomic status would be negatively related to political activism among Palestinian female 
youth. Additionally, due to the history of poorer Palestinian women (as opposed to middle or 
upper class Palestinian women) engaging specifically in supportive forms of activism 
(Hiltermann, 1998), it was expected that socioeconomic status would be negatively associated 
more strongly with supportive activism than direct activism.  
Consistent with previous literature and theory, some of the indicators of socioeconomic 
status (SES) included in this study were significantly related to female activism, somewhat more 
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specifically related to supportive activism, and, thus, supported the proposed hypotheses. Since 
three separate indicators (level of parental education, relative deprivation, and place of residence) 
were included in the analyses, this section will follow with a discussion of only the statistically 
significant relationships between specific SES indicators and activism (see Chapter 4 for the 
results of the relationships between all indicators and activism). 
First, at the bivariate level, the SES indicators of parental education and living in a city 
(compared to a town or camp) were negatively related to both supportive and direct activism. 
Additionally, there were significant positive correlations between living in a camp (i.e., lower 
SES) and both forms of activism. At the multivariate level, however, only place of residence 
retained its significance as a predictor of supportive activism (but note that for direct activism, 
place of residence had a significant direct effect but the block of SES predictors it was in did not 
contribute unique variance). This appears to indicate that there are aspects of living in a refugee 
camp above and beyond what camp status shares with other forms of SES and with other 
predictors of activism that predict higher rates of supportive activism among female youth. It is 
likely, therefore, that the particularly dense and impoverished conditions of refugee camp life in 
Palestine provide an extra dose of frustration and desire for change which, according to Relative 
Deprivation Theory, would motivate Palestinian female camp dwellers to action.  
In addition to the nature and direction of the relationship between socioeconomic status 
and activism, the results show a distinction between types of activism. As discussed above, the 
group of SES indicators accounted for significant variance in supportive activism and not in 
direct activism. Consistent with historical accounts of Palestinian female activism, those young 
women with less monetary resources appear also to have engaged in gendered forms of activism. 
The fact that at the bivariate level low SES also predicted direct forms of activism diverges from 
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past writings (i.e., that direct forms would be committed by middle or upper class women only), 
but the additional finding that in the multivariate analyses it did not account for unique variance 
does indicate that, compared to supportive activism, direct forms of activism are driven more 
strongly by other forces (e.g., religion and politics).   
Overall, these findings support theory by providing evidence that the tenets of Relative 
Deprivation Theory not only apply at the group level (e.g., see Khawaja for a relevant study of 
Palestinians during the first Intifada), but also help explain young female political activism at the 
individual level. This extension of the validity of Relative Deprivation Theory can help scholars 
and practitioners to credit socioeconomic status, as well as frustrations that accompany deprived 
status, as a driving force for an individual’s political activism.  
Furthermore, these results illustrate that the relationship between socioeconomic status 
and activism is dependent on the context in which the activism occurs. For example, studies in 
peaceful nations (i.e., Atkins & Hart, 2003) show a positive relationship between civic 
involvement and socioeconomic status – thus, higher involvement by the more advantaged. In 
contrast, this study, together with the literature on girl soldiers (Kearins, 2002), finds the 
opposite – that is, higher involvement among the less advantaged. The context in which the 
activism occurs – that is, in peaceful versus conflicted conditions - appears to be critical in 
determining the direction of the relationship between socioeconomic status and activism. This 
finding is important because, once replicated, it would assist in refining theory about activism, 
specifically highlighting the uniqueness of political activism  
In sum, while these findings differed somewhat from historical accounts of poorer 
Palestinian women engaging in supportive forms of activism (i.e., those living in the camp 
engaged in supportive and direct activism), they provided support for the application of Relative 
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Deprivation Theory beyond the group or community level to the individual level, as well as 
refine thinking on the relationship between socioeconomic status and activism by highlighting 
the contextual influences that affect the direction of this relationship. 
Religiosity and Religio-Political Affiliation 
 In addition to those variables discussed above, religiosity, political affiliation, and religio-
political affiliation were also examined for their relationship to activism among Palestinian 
female youth. These variables were included due to the strong influences in Palestinian society 
of religion, specifically Islam, the political nature of the first Intifada, and the overlap in 
Palestinian society between religion and politics. Additionally, theory, such as Political 
Stabilization Theory (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006), which suggests that youth adopt the views 
and behaviors of significant socializing agents, such as religious and political leaders, support the 
inclusion of these variables. Because of the complex relationship between religiosity and 
political affiliation, the hypotheses and the discussion of findings relative to them here proceed 
systematically from main effects of religiosity and political affiliation to combinations of the 
two.  
Religiosity 
As noted above, Political Stabilization Theory accounts for the role of religious doctrine 
in predicting political activism, in that religious leaders can be socializing agents and impart 
political ideologies and beliefs to their followers. The dominant religion in Palestine is Islam, 
and scholars suggest that according to the Islamic religion, women and female youth are 
restricted to the home or private sphere. Correspondingly, their autonomy in public places is 
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limited (see Ahmed, 1992). Therefore, based on theory and the tenets of Islam, it was expected 
that religiosity would be negatively associated with activism, specifically so for direct activism. 
Contrary to what was expected, however, higher degrees of religiosity were associated 
with higher - rather than lower - levels of engagement in both supportive and direct activism. 
Despite documented evidence that Islam supports the restriction of women to the home and 
private sphere (i.e., Ahmed, 1992), the Palestinian young women in this sample who were more 
religious did not appear to adhere to the proposed religious mandate suggested by Ahmed; 
indeed, the more religious females left the private sphere to engage in activism more so than did 
the less religious females.  
Before offering interpretations of this unexpected finding, it is important to acknowledge 
the limitations of the items used to measure religiosity and the impact these limitations may have 
on the findings. For example, only three items were used to measure religiosity: read the Koran, 
thought about religion, talked about religion. While these three items measure the personal 
nature of religion, they do not assess a subjective appraisal of one’s own level of religiosity. For 
example, despite praying and reading the Koran often, one may view herself as not being very 
religious. Therefore, a subjective appraisal of religiosity may have provided a more accurate 
indicator of religiosity. Similarly, other items such as asking how often one gives to the poor and 
if one fasts during Ramadan (two of the five pillars of Islam) might have more accurately tapped 
religious commitment in this sample such that the expected effect might have been discerned.  
However, to the degree that the measure employed here did adequately reflect at least part of the 
relevant religious orientation of young women, it is important to try to interpret the unexpected 
findings. 
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One explanation for this divergent finding would be that in addition to Islam bringing 
scripts about gender norms, it might also transmit scripts about nationalism and the promotion of 
the Palestinian people. Peteet (1991, 1996), for example, suggests that involvement of 
Palestinian women in the different Palestinian conflicts has been accepted in the wider society 
when their involvement is framed as an act to protect Palestine’s sons and daughters. To the 
degree that this sanctioned behavior in behalf of a political purpose is also viewed as consistent 
with living one’s religion, then it is sensible that more religious young women were also more 
active politically. In other words, fighting for equality for the Palestinian people in their struggle 
against the Israeli Occupation was likely viewed as sanctioned by Allah and therefore making it 
permissible for young women to go against gendered scripts and engage in activism.  
Additionally, Treacher (2003) suggests that Islam differs in different contexts and 
countries. Therefore behaviors displayed by female youth that would not be permitted in one 
country, may be acceptable in the neighboring region of Palestine. In general, however, all forms 
of Islam place high importance on behaviors that display obligation, honor, and responsibility to 
one’s family and community (Treacher, 2003). While in some Islamic countries gendered norms 
may prevail in discouraging women from engaging in the public sphere, Palestinian women and 
female youth may have felt encouraged to engage in activism against Israel since this was seen 
as a sign of the responsibility of promoting the well-being of the Palestinian society and the 
protection of future Palestinian generations.  
It is important to note that scholars believe that the wider societal acceptance for activism 
is only permissible if women are fighting for Palestine, and not their own rights (see Treacher, 
2003). Therefore any expectation that religion would promote activism in other forms and for 
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other causes, such as for women’s rights, may be unwarranted (see Treacher, 2003; Shalhoub-
Kevorkian, 2003). 
Political Affiliation and Religio-Political Affiliation 
In addition to the role of religiosity, ideas concerning the role of political affiliation and 
affiliation with a specific political party (religio-political affiliation) were also tested in this 
thesis. This was important to examine because while virtually all Gaza females were Muslim, the 
varying political parties to which they were or were not affiliated have different interpretations of 
what Islam expects of its adherents regarding political goals (i.e., not the commonly endorsed 
struggle against Israel, but more so in how the conflict can or should be resolved). As expected, 
results indicated that affiliation with a political party, regardless of which party, was associated 
with increased involvement in supportive forms of activism. However, with direct activism, in 
addition to the positive effect of affiliation, a specific affiliation with the secular political party, 
Fatah, was uniquely predictive of increased levels of engagement. Thus, while females from both 
political affiliations engaged in supportive forms of activism more so than unaffiliated females, it 
was distinctly Fatah females (compared to females affiliated with Hamas or Islamic Jihad) who 
participated more in direct, front line forms of activism.  
While this finding implies a political (i.e., party affiliation) motive for direct activism, it 
would still be possible that the effect of religion was operative, in that, regardless of affiliation it 
was still the more religious females who were actively engaged. This line of thinking lead to the 
final set of hypotheses and tests relative to the interaction between religion and political 
affiliation. Specifically, it was thought that levels of political activism among females who 
belonged to Fatah would differ depending on their level of religiosity. Similarly, levels of 
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activism for females who belonged to fundamentalists Islamic political parties would also differ 
depending on their level of religiosity. Contrary to what was expected, however, there was no 
joint effect of religiosity and religio-political affiliation. Instead, as for supportive activism, it 
was found that both Fatah and fundamentalist Islamic females at all reported levels of religiosity 
participated equally as much in supportive activism. Similarly, for direct activism, Fatah females, 
who participated more so than fundamentalist females, also reported varying levels of religiosity. 
In sum, it was found that despite the fact that, overall, being more religious was predictive of 
higher rates of activism, it was not the degree of religiosity that explained why females of 
specific political groups engaged in different patterns of activism.  
Despite these complexities the findings relative to the role of religion and political party 
do support the use of theory, specifically Political Stabilization Theory (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 
2006), in understanding Palestinian female youth activism in the first Intifada. For example, 
females who expressed affiliation with the fundamentalist Islamic groups (Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad) reported lower levels of activism, specifically direct activism. First, affiliation with a 
political party predicted both forms of activism, suggesting the presence of a political identity 
among these young females. Second, the lower rates of direct activism among fundamentalist 
Islamic females could also reflect political/religious values to the extent that Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad more strongly endorse traditional gender roles and behaviors than the secular Fatah party. 
Thus, it may have been that the political views and behaviors supported by the leadership in 
these fundamental, Islamic groups had been passed down or adopted by young female adherents. 
 Therefore, one explanation of these findings is that the gender scripts about appropriate 
female behavior originally thought to be displayed in religiosity alone were, in fact, present in 
the teachings of the Palestinian political parties. Supportive forms of activism are more 
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consistent with appropriate, traditional gender roles than direct forms of activism. Thus the fact 
that Hamas and Islamic Jihad girls engaged in supportive forms of activism, but less so in direct 
activism, may suggest that in these fundamental, Islamic groups political activism is framed as 
appropriate only when the activism is consistent with gender norms. Participation then would 
still be seen as an appropriate (i.e., sanctioned by Allah) way to promote nationalism for the 
Palestinian peoples in their fight against Israel, but participation would only be appropriate when 
it is consistent with the religious teachings of these groups.  
An alternate explanation, however, may be found not in the gender scripts of the political 
parties but, rather, in their political ideology and thus the political identity of the groups’ 
members. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that adherents to all political groups were Muslim, the 
varying groups had distinct elements of their political ideology. Although it is unclear how 
differentiated the political values and goals of the various parties were during the early years of 
the first Intifada, during the latter years of the movement (the years investigated in this study) 
contrasting political agendas were apparent (Tessler, 1974). For example, compared to Fatah, 
Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s leadership was politically unwilling to compromise with Israel and 
rejected the idea of a two-state solution (Hunter, 1993; Lybarger, 2007). Thus, the lower rates of 
direct activism for young women who belonged to fundamentalist Islamic political groups may 
reflect the political ideology of these groups in that they were less willing to fight for the 
resolution (i.e., sustainable peace with Israel) that Fatah was moving toward (Smith, 2001). 
Correspondingly, the higher rates of direct activism among Fatah young women might be 
explained by their endorsement of the political agenda of their party (i.e., fighting for equality, 
recognition, and self-determination alongside Israel).  
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Finally, if it was political ideology more than gender ideology that drove direct forms of 
activism for fundamentalist female youth, then one would expect the same pattern for Palestinian 
young men, with those belonging to fundamental Islamic political groups engaging less than 
their Fatah peers. Those data are available and will be examined in an effort to clarify whether 
fundamental, Islamic Palestinian political groups imparted gendered ideology or political 
ideology to their followers.   
Summary  
 In summary, this thesis has sought to identify predictors of political activism (both 
supportive and direct forms) during the first Palestinian Intifada as a means of advancing the 
literature on youth and political violence by focusing exclusively on female experience and 
examining predictors of activism and not effects of exposure to violence. In general it is was 
suggested that while the Western interpretations of classic identity theory should perhaps not be 
applied to Palestinian female youth activism, the concepts of identity theory may still provide 
explanation for why older females engaged in activism. Additionally, for female youth to 
become involved in political conflict, the thesis demonstrated the importance of internal 
motivations, or appraisals of efficacy, above and beyond external, contextual factors. Those 
factors included living in a refugee camp (and presumably its associated frustrations) and 
political affiliation.  
 Most surprisingly, however, it was learned that the more religious these young women 
were the more likely they were to engage in activism. Perhaps, then, rather than Islam solely 
carrying scripts about gender norms and behaviors, scripts about nationalism might be just as 
apparent in Palestinian religiosity. Finally, while there some ambiguity as to how affiliation with 
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Palestinian political groups, specifically fundamentalists Islamic groups, impacted political 
activism, it was shown that while both Fatah and fundamentalist Islamic girls engaged in 
activists behaviors that are gendered in nature, distinctly Fatah young women were the ones who 
engaged in front-line, direct forms of activism.  
Strengths and Limitations 
 In light of these findings and the significance these discoveries, it is important to outline 
the strengths and limitations of this study so as to better understand the scope of interpretations 
of the findings. Before discussing the strengths of this study, however, an acknowledgement of 
the limitations of this thesis will follow. Primarily, this study employed secondary data analytic 
methods which limited the selection of variables to be included in the tested models. Had the 
study been designed explicitly to test the hypotheses of the thesis a more complete set of 
variables would have been included (i.e., degree of activism of participants’ mothers, identity 
measures, etc). Similarly, the constructs that the thesis attempted to test could have been 
measured differently and perhaps more validly (i.e., a more comprehensive or culturally 
appropriate measure of religiosity may have impacted the direction of the relationship between 
religiosity and activism, and additional or different measures of socioeconomic status could have 
helped reconcile the findings with theory, etc.). 
Secondly, the geographic location of the sample (i.e., the Gaza Strip) limits the 
generalizibility of these findings. While the selection of sampling in the Gaza Strip has its own 
strengths (i.e., the intensity of fighting compared to other areas of Palestine), the exclusion of 
participants from the West Bank and East Jerusalem limits the claims that one can make about 
motivators for political action generally among Palestinian female youth.  Despite some 
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similarities between Gaza and the West Bank, specifically the establishment of refugee camps 
and the conditions within the camps, caution is warranted in applying the results from this thesis 
to all Palestinian females. However, future studies could examine the role of camp life in all 
Palestinian territories, as well as the other variables used in this thesis, in predicting activism 
among female youth in order to provide more clarity as to the generalizibility of these results.  
Similarly, the findings should be understood in light of the political situation at the time 
of data collection. Since the first Intifada, the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis has 
continued as seen in a second (al-Aqsa) Intifada and the recent bombing of Gaza by Israel in 
response to Hamas-launched rockets into proximal parts of Israel. Further, Palestine is currently 
essentially divided into two distinct political entities, with Fatah governing in the West Bank and 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It is unclear whether the same relationships would be found if the 
survey were completed in more recent history. The role of historical and political events may 
alter the level of political engagement and motivations for engagement in Palestinian females. 
Thus while this study provides a much needed insight into a relatively understudied population, 
caution should proceed applying these findings to Palestinian female youth today. 
Despite these limitations, the thesis has several strengths. First, and arguably the most 
significant, is the purpose of this study (i.e., identifying predictors of political activism among 
Palestinian female youth). As stated earlier, few studies in this field focus exclusively on female 
experience, while no studies focus solely on non-soldier female experience. Additionally, 
researchers most often take the perspective of analyzing the effects of exposure to violence on 
psychological and behavioral functioning, instead of questioning what would motivate youth, 
specifically female youth in a patriarchal society, to engage publically in political activism.  
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 Second, the thesis utilized a strong measure of activism. Although the measure of 
activism was not developed in this study (see Barber and Olsen, 2009, for a description of the 
development of the measurement for this construct) and thus this author does not take any credit 
for the strength of the measurement of this construct, the use of an arguably comprehensive 
measure of activism, one that originated from interviews with Palestinian youth themselves, 
allows this study to capture a variety of political behaviors, both supportive and front-line,  and 
to further test the differing effects of variables such as socioeconomic status, efficacy, and 
religiosity on each different types of activism. 
 Third, the use of multiple theoretical traditions and bodies of literature is a strength of the 
thesis. Due to the exploratory nature of this study and the relatively limited body of literature on 
youth and political violence, an examination of multiple theoretical traditions and studies of 
inquiry have allowed a more holistic understanding of potential motivating factors for activism 
and ground both the reader and author more broadly in an understanding not only of females in 
countries of political conflict, but also in issues of civic engagement and religion and Islam. 
Implications 
 As a final point of discussion for this thesis, it is important briefly to identify the 
implications of a study such as this in informing diverse bodies of literature as well as practice. 
First, this study has implications for informing the literature on the development of civic 
engagement. For example, Sherrod and Lauckhardt (2008) suggest that the development of civic 
engagement is necessary for a democracy to function properly since democracies require input 
and participation from its citizens. While it can be argued that the construct of political activism 
as measured in this thesis is not synonymous to Sherrod and Lauckhardt’s construct of civic 
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engagement, it is clear that at least the motivation for Palestinian activism was to promote the 
well-being of the Palestinian people, a motivation that is also common among youth who are 
involved civically in peaceful nations. Therefore, the findings inform and refine the thinking in 
the literature on civic engagement by examining predictors of civic involvement through a 
specific type of engagement, activism, and within a specific context, political violence.  
Additionally, the thesis informs the practice of the development of civic engagement in 
Palestinian society. Knowing which factors are associated with activism is important for parents, 
teachers, and government officials. Again, if societies which elect their political leaders are 
dependent on the involvement of their people in the election process, then knowing how to aid in 
the development of civic engagement in youth, specifically female youth, would be quite 
valuable for practitioners and those who work directly with Palestinian youth. Furthermore, 
studies show that political activism begets civic engagement (see Barber & Olsen, 2009 for 
evidence from the same sample).  
 Thirdly, knowing the characteristics of who is most likely to engage in activism can 
provide insights into understanding the link between activism and negative psychosocial 
outcomes (i.e., depression) as seen in Barber’s (1999a, 2001) studies. By identifying potential 
factors that are salient to the development of activism, one can then begin to tease out the 
longitudinal relationship between predictors of activism, activism, and the effects of activism in 
such a way that one may be able to identify precursors to higher levels of depression as 
moderated through political engagement in Palestinian female youth. While this study did not 
undertake this challenge, it does provide a framework for future researchers to model this 
relationship. 
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 Finally, these results have implications for those wanting to discourage political activism 
in politically violent countries and conflicts. For example, governments wanting to bring about 
peace and to discourage young women from engaging in an ongoing conflict would be wise to 
invest resources in improving the standard of living, infrastructure, or socioeconomic status of 
these young women. Additionally, understanding the role of religiosity within a specific context 
could provide insights into why young women would engage in behaviors that seem to be 
contrary to cultural norms. Thus understanding the reasoning behind involvement in political 
violence would go far in helping governments identify those who are likely to be active as well 
as allow these same governments to proactively address situations (i.e., economic disparities) 
that have been shown to be associated with political activism among female youth in hopes of 
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